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ABSTRACT 
The premise of this thesis is that a kill chain analysis can be used to ascertain 
survivability probabilities that can be used to analyze ship vulnerabilities to the anti-ship 
cruise missile (ASCM) problem.  Using the kill chain framework, two approaches are 
examined.  The kill chain, as perceived by the eyes and sensors of the ASCM, are used 
for the analysis.  From this perspective, the ASCM encounters the formidable layered 
defense of a target ship to include hard kill and soft kill measures.  The first analysis uses 
a time line framework to calculate potential engagements and from this, compute the 
likely probability of success.  The second approach uses decision tree software to analyze 
a single ASCM vs. target ship surface to air missile encounter using a Monte Carlo 
simulation with derived probabilities of success and failure.  This paper looks at eighteen 
ASCMs available in the world today and examines their probability of success against a 
generic ship that has a defensive suite similar to the current Arleigh Burke class 
destroyers.  A key finding was that for ASCMs to be successful, they should fly lower 
and faster and incorporate soft kill measures.  Hence, future ship builders need to be 
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Much discussion has occurred in recent years concerning the proliferation of 
cruise missiles throughout the world (Burgess 2008).  This proliferation raises concerns 
for the U.S. Navy because, in recent times, the Navy has operated more in littoral regions 
rather than in the open seas.  The littoral regions create vulnerabilities to Navy ships that 
are absent in the open seas.  Placing Navy ships in this region makes them vulnerable to a 
wide range of threat systems that many countries/groups can now afford to own and 
operate.  Although some of these threat systems date back to the U.S.-Soviet cold war 
days, many can easily be modified with newer electronics and quality GPS navigation 
(Burgess 2008).  These modifications can improve tracking and controlling algorithms 
due to significant advances in these technical arenas.  It is all too easy to purchase these 
weapons on the open market.  Burgess’ article suggests that some missiles can be 
purchased for as little as $64K (US Dollar).  Mahnken (2005) says that cheap anti-ship 
cruise missiles (ASCMs) can be purchased for $100K and that the cost has decreased 
significantly in recent years.  This makes ASCMs available to a wide variety of countries 
and non-state actors—both friendly and non-friendly. 
The ASCM problem is not likely to go away any time soon.  Therefore, ships 
built for the twenty first century must be designed to deal with them in order to survive.  
This paper takes a look at analyzing this problem using a kill-chain analysis with the 
assistance of decision tree software. 
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the potential to defend against anti-ship 
cruise missile threats to Navy ships using decision analysis techniques and within a kill 
chain framework.  Many studies of ASCM’s use computer modeling that requires 
extensive computer resources.  The proposed technique in this thesis uses commercial 
off-the-shelf (COTS) software programs and can be computed on a standard issue  
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computer capable of running enterprise-approved spreadsheet software.  The flexibility of 
this approach to the problem, lends itself to easy modifications and tailoring to answer 
similar questions for other threats and other targets. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
What can ship designer’s do to improve survivability against anti-ship cruise 
missiles?  What ASCM features can be exploited to enhance the ability to attack them 
before they reach their target?  How can common software tools such as decision tree 
models and spreadsheets be used to help analyze this scenario? 
D. BENEFITS OF STUDY 
This study intends to help ship designers better understand the cruise missile 
threat from the perspective of the anti-ship cruise missile using simple, off-the-shelf, and 
readily available software tools.  This knowledge can provide ship designers additional 
tools to attack the ASCM problem and incorporate features in their designs to enhance 
ship survivability. 
E. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
This thesis starts with the kill chain as outlined in The Fundamentals of Aircraft 
Combat Survivability Analysis and Design (Ball 2003), and then modifies it to address 
ASCM.   The Ball 2003 text is a textbook for aircraft survivability, but the similarities 
between missiles and aircraft can be exploited to solve a similar problem for cruise 
missiles.  Only minor modifications to address ASCM survivability are needed.  In most 
cases, aircraft survivability factors can be directly applied to ASCMs.  Differences 
include size, weight, performance characteristics, and the fact that missiles do not carry 
humans. 
For the purpose of this study, only open source unclassified data is used.  A 
typical ship in the U.S. Navy is an Arleigh Burke class destroyer.  Its weapon system 
defense suite is described in Table 1.  The application is not limited to any one class of 
ship; it can be applied to any ship.  Further analysis on specific ships can always be 
accomplished. 
3 
          Characteristic
Ship Weapon











40 nmi Command Inertial
Semi-active 
RF/IR M 3.0




.8 nmi Semi-Active Inertial
Semi-active 
RF/IR M 3.5
  - Vulcan Phalanx Point Defense
1.5 km
.8 nmi  - Command N/A N/A 1,030 m/s
  - SPY-1D Air Search/Target Acq
167 km
90 nmi  - E/F N/A N/A N/A
  - SPS-64/SPS-67 Navigation
25 km
13.5 nmi  - I/J N/A N/A N/A
  - SLQ-32 ESM/ECM  -  - N/A N/A N/A N/A
  - Super RBOC Chaff/Flares  -  - N/A N/A N/A N/A
  - Nulka Chaff/Flares  -  - N/A N/A N/A N/A






Table 1.   Typical Arleigh Burke class ship characteristics. 
For the ASCM kill chain analysis, the probability definitions of Table 2 are used.  
These definitions are based on the Ball (2003) definitions, but are modified for 
application in the ASCM case.  An ASCM will closely mirror an aircraft with the 
exception of physical characteristics that will change probabilities in the kill chain.  The 
term “propagator” in this case refers to a defensive item from the target ship.  For an 
Arleigh Burke class destroyer, as shown in Table 1, the propagators would be an RIM-66 
Standard Missile 2, Medium Range (SM-2MR), a RIM-162 Extended Sea Sparrow 
Missile (ESSM), or bullets from the Vulcan Phalanx Close-In Weapon System (CIWS).  
Additional factors affecting the kill chain are the soft-kill measures such as electronic 
jamming, use of decoys (both Radio Frequency (RF) and Infrared (IR)), and the use of 
expendables such as chaff/flares.  For a real life example, an Arleigh Burke class 
destroyer has a SLQ-32 jamming suite and SRBOC chaff launchers and Nulka off-board 
RF jammer decoys (FAS.org - DDG-51 Arleigh Burke-class). 
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Table 2.   Probability Definitions used in this report. 
SUSCEPTIBILITY DEFINITIONS (Ball 2003) 
PA = Probability threat weapon is active, searching and ready to encounter the 
ASCM that entered its defended area.  Weapons with respect to the ASCM 
include the SAMs, guns, jamming, chaff, and decoys. 
PD|A = Conditional probability that the ASCM is detected, given that the threat is 
active 
PL|D = Conditional probability that the ASCM is tracked and engaged, a fire 
control solution is obtained, and a missile is launched or a gun is fired at the 
ASCM, given that the threat was active and detected the ASCM 
PI|L = Conditional probability that the threat propagator (target ship system) 
intercepts the ASCM, given that the propagator was launched/ fired at the 
ASCM and engaged in a fire control solution 
PH|I = Conditional probability that the propagator (target ship system) hits the 
ASCM, given that the propagator has intercepted the ASCM 
Ship perspective probabilities (Ball and Calvano 1994) 
PDCT= Probability that the propagator (target ship system) will detect the incoming 
ASCM, classify it as a threat and produce a targeting solution given that the 
target ship is active and ready to deploy its defensive weapon systems. This 
is similar to PD|A times PL/D above and will be depicted as the DCT phase 
 PLFI= Probability that the propagator (target ship system) will launch its weapon 
and control it to an intercept (i.e., a hit) with the target or control a 
defensive missile engagement to an intercept. This is a similar to PI/L times 
PH/I above and will be depicted as the engagement phase 
VULNERABILITY DEFINITION 
PK|H = Conditional probability that the ASCM is killed, given a hit by the 
propagator 
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The mapping of these probabilities is depicted in the decision tree diagram in 
Figure 1.  This chart is derived from Ball’s (2003, Figure 1.6) aircraft survivability text, 
but modified to depict the survivability of an ASCM instead of an aircraft.  Note that this 
diagram represents a single shot/single intercept scenario between a SAM system and the 
ASCM.  All probabilities listed are applicable to this modification.  The key differences 
between the aircraft model and the ASCM model are the values associated with the 
functions that affect ASCM survivability.  Even where the functions are similar, the 
values assigned to the probability are likely to be very different.  For example, the 
probability of an aircraft being detected would be different from an ASCM being 
detected.  This is due to the ASCM typically having a lower radar cross section (RCS) 
and a lower ingress altitude, making it more difficult to detect initially.  During the ships 
detection, targeting, and engagement phases (Nodes (2) and (3) in Figure 1), the ASCM 
is in an autonomous search mode.  An aircraft in a similar position would also be in a 
search mode, but it would allow for human intervention (such as maneuvering).  Since 
ASCMs do not carry aircrew, the only potential human intervention would be a human-
initiated self-destruct mechanism.  If a decision were made to early self-destruct, the 
target ship would credit itself with an unearned kill.  Human survivability aboard the 







































































Figure 1.   Anti-Ship Cruise Missile Kill Chain Tree Diagram (after Ball 2003). 
For this analysis, the Ball and Calvano (1994) definitions are used.  These are 
tailored for studying the kill chain from the target ship’s perspective where the ship is 
being pursued by an airborne threat.  This point of view is depicted on the left side of 
Figure 2.  This paper uses the same equations, but changes the point of view to be from 
an ASCM being attacked by a single missile or weapon (propagator) coming from the 
target ship.  This view is seen on the right side of Figure 2.   From the article (Ball and 
Calvano 1994), hitability is defined as: 
(1) * *H A DCT LFIP P P P=  
where 1AP =  is assumed because the assumption is made that the target ship is prepared 
for battle in this case. 
The equation in Ball and Calvano is from the ship’s perspective.  From the 
ASCM’s point of view, the ASCM’s survivability component for the susceptible phase 
(notated with the superscript A), is described by: 
7 
(2) 1 *A A AS DCT LFIP P P= −  
Since the ship is assumed to be ready for an attack, an assumption is made that, if 
a threat is detected, the ship’s defensive systems will be able to track it and classify it as a 
threat, and prosecute it.  This assumption may be degraded eventually due to soft kill 
methods incorporated by the ASCM.  Given this assumption,  
(3) /
A A A
DCT D A DP P P= =  
Similarly, it is assumed that if the target is classified as a threat and tracked, the target 
ship will launch an eligible missile to an intercept within its ability to meet the timing 
constraints.   For now, the timing restraint is referring to the delay required for detection, 
tracking, reaction, and decision making. 
(4) / /*
A A A A
LFI L D I L EP P P P= =  
The final item in the Kill Chain, Pk/h, is a term associated with the vulnerability of 
the system being observed, the ASCM in this situation. Vulnerability, in this case, is the 
probability that the ASCM is destroyed to the point that it is not able to complete its 
mission.  For this kill chain, the probability of kill would then be described as: 
(5) /* *
A A A A
K D E K HP P P P=  
And therefore, the probability of the ASCM surviving against one shot is: 
(6) /1 1 * *
A A A A A
S K D E K HP P P P P= − = −  
To analyze the various ASCMs, reasonable values for PD. PE, and PK/H will be 
derived for each missile engagement and used to solve Equation (6).  Where analytical 
derivations are not possible, reasonable assumptions of performance will be made and the 
rationale will be provided. 
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PSK = PSH* PSK/H
Ship Survivability
PSS = 1- PSK















PAK = PAH* PAK/H
ASCM Survivability
PAS = 1- PAK
SHIP PERSPECTIVE ASCM PERSPECTIVE
(After Ball and Calvano, 1994)
 
Figure 2.   Probability definitions from the target ship and ASCM perspectives.  
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II. OPERATING ENVIRONMENTS  
A. INTRODUCTION 
The operating environments for this analysis are narrowed down to four specific 
cases.  These cases represent typical operational scenarios for ASCMS employment as 
depicted in Figure 3.  The analysis assumes the target ship to be at sea, within the 
targeting range of the ASCM, and ready to defend itself with available defenses.  This 
paper only addresses survivability characteristics, i.e., susceptibility and vulnerability.  
Other “-ilities,” such as availability, reliability, and supportability, are not assessed here. 
The four cases are [A] surface-launched, [B] subsurface-launched, [C] land-
launched, and [D] air-launched.  Each case brings a unique challenge to the ASCM 
problem.  This paper looks at these challenges to ascertain whether they bring a 
significant fidelity to the analysis to better understand how each is best defeated. A 
sampling of 19 real world anti ship cruise missiles collected from Jane’s Naval Weapon 
Systems (http://search.janes.com) is listed in Table 20, Table 21, and Table 22 in the 
Appendix.  To keep the study unclassified, only unclassified data was collected.  The 





























Evolved Sea Sparrow 
Missile (ESSM)












Figure 3.   Typical Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM) profiles. 
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1. Surface Ship Launched ASCM [Case A] 
a. The surface ship launched ASCM can be launched by any surface warship.  
Due to capability considerations, large warships such as destroyers and cruisers have the 
ability to carry larger missiles with larger, more complex payloads and longer effective 
ranges.  Smaller ships such as patrol boats will likely carry missiles with limited range 
and payload capabilities.  All ships have a limitation on the number of ASCMs available 
to launch, but small ships/boats will have greater limitations. 
b. Surface ships rely on own-ship acquisition and Over-the-Horizon (OTH) 
methods for targeting.  Many ships have long range early warning radars such as the SPS-
49 and electronic surveillance/attack systems such as the SLQ-32.  These systems alone 
usually lack complete targeting capability, however, since they can’t ensure target 
allegiance and intent.  Targeting can be augmented from other on-ship and off-ship 
sensors and sources.  Although not relevant here, to defend themselves against ASCMs, 
most threat combatant ships will have a combination of long range surface to air missiles 
(such as the SA-N-6) and a point defense system comparable to the Phalanx CIWS, 
Russian AK-630, or a Chinese Type 730 CIWS. 
2. Sub-Surface Launched ASCM [Case B] 
a. The sub-surface launched ASCM is typically launched from a submarine 
at periscope depth or less.  Most submarines have the ability to carry sophisticated 
ASCMs and can launch them while submerged.  
b. Submarines can similarly rely on own-ship acquisition and OTH methods 
for targeting.  Onboard sonar systems can provide additional acquisition support, but data 
for longer range shot’s will likely come from off-board sources.  Targeting can be 
accomplished by both means.  It will be difficult for a ship to avoid detection by a 
subsurface threat, unless it has considerable anti-submarine warfare resources.  Once an 
ASCM is launched and has broached the waterline, however, its profile will present 
similar challenges as ASCM’s launched in the other regimes. 
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3. Land-Based Launched ASCM [Case C] 
a. The land-based ASCM can be launched from a fixed ground site or from a 
vehicle.  When ships are operating in the threat littoral regions, they are likely to be 
targeted by land-based ASCMs that have the range to reach them. 
b. Land-based acquisitions are similar to their sea-borne relatives.  Early 
acquisition data can be obtained by ground based early warning and targeting systems, or 
passed from ship or airborne team members via communications links.  To defend against 
land-based ASCMs, ships will use the same suite of missiles and guns as in the surface 
and sub-surface scenarios.  The best defense against a land-based ASCM is to avoid the 
threat engagement envelope.  Unfortunately, littoral operations will not allow complete 
avoidance. 
4. Air Launched ASCM [Case D] 
a. The air launched ASCM is launched from either a fixed wing or rotary 
wing aircraft.  The fixed wing aircraft can be a fighter aircraft or a larger patrol and 
surveillance aircraft.  Rotary wing aircraft include helicopters or Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles (UAVs) of varying sizes. 
b Aircraft can rely on own-ship acquisition data and/or on externally 
provided targeting data.  The aircraft launched ASCM may be smaller than average but 
may have longer effective range since the missile can be launched from a high altitude, 
reducing the energy required to reach target.  The ship will defend against the air 
launched ASCM in a manner similar to the other launch scenarios.  Early warning can 
potentially be obtained from the launch platform signatures in the RF, IR and visual 
regimes. 
5. Threats to ASCMs 
The target warship is a threat to the ASCM if it is aware that a threat is imminent.  
Its weapon system set is designed to create barriers to the ASCM success.  Contributors 
to the kill chain effectiveness will be the long range SAM, the short range SAM, the 




ASCM operating environments affect design parameters that affect execution 
profiles in turn.  Although most ASCMS have a final target run in, the launch phase of 
each scenario varies.  Air launched ASCMS can potentially have longer ranges due to 
launching at high altitude, but weight is limited which means lower explosive capability.  
Ship, submarine, and land launch sites can handle heavy weight missiles but the missiles 
have to use larger amounts of fuel to fly at low altitudes or to climb to high altitudes to 
achieve long range.  Ships and submarine are mobile and can move to locations that favor 
them.  Submarines can hide underwater and launch from almost anywhere.  Land ASCMs 
can hide behind terrain features, but will eventually be range-limited to some maximum 
distance from shore. 
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III. RESEARCH ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This section describes the decision tree and time line analysis methodologies for 
the selected ASCM missile system encounters with a target ship.  Data for kill chain 
probabilities are derived from calculations and estimates of the factors in the kill chain 
model.  These factors include variables such as estimates of intercept ranges, missile 
RCS, calculations of the number of shot opportunities, and estimates of electronic 
warfare system effectiveness (i.e., soft kills). 
Analysis Methodology: 
1. Decision Tree Analysis 
Two software tools were used to analyze this problem.  The first was a software 
product from the Palisade Corporation called @Risk for Excel (version 5.5) with 
Precision Tree and Monte Carlo simulation tools used as add-ins to Microsoft Excel.  
Second, Microsoft Excel was used with its graphing and analytical capabilities to derive 
time line charts for a time-line analysis.  The @Risk program facilitates a decision tree 
and Monte Carlo analysis of the models developed.  The kill chain, as described in Ball 
2003 and shown in Figure 1, is modeled in the Decision Tree software and the results are 
shown in Figure 4.  When soft kill characteristics were incorporated, the modified 
decision tree in Figure 5 can be used.  Soft kill characteristics are added to the detection 
and engagement nodes at appropriate branches in the model where soft kill effects would 
be realized.  All soft kill event branches are identical; however, values for each branch 
will likely vary.  The soft kill event branches are Electronic Countermeasures (ECM), RF 
decoy, IR Decoy, and “Other.”  ECM addresses the probability of jamming used by the 
ASCM or a contributor on the ASCM side of the kill chain.  The RF decoy can be either 
chaff or an actual decoy used by the ASCM forces or the ASCM itself.  Flares are 
addressed in the UV/IR Decoy event branches.  Chaff and RF decoys will be instrumental 
in defeating RF sensors on the target ship where flares and IR decoys will be instrumental  
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to the IR seekers.  The “Other” event branch is reserved for all other cases—it was set to 
an arbitrary value to ensure the sum of the probabilities nodes add up to one which is a 
requirements in most decision-tree software programs. 
The additional soft kill branches in Figure 5 reduce to the branches of Figure 4 
when the soft kill branch probabilities are reduce to zero.  In this case the ASCM survival 
is completely realized in the “other” branch and hence becomes redundant.  With this 
approach, the model represented in Figure 5 can be used for both scenarios, i.e., both with 
and without soft kill measures. 
Soft kill measures incorporated by the target ship should also be addressed in 
some analyses.  To handle this case, the equation in the “ASCM KILLED” branches is 
modified to: 
(7) ( ) ( ) ( )
A
K K SAM K Ship SK K ASCM SKP P P P− −= + −  
Where PK(SAM) is the probability of kill associated with the SAM attacking the 
ASCM, PK(Ship-SK) is the probability that the ASCM will be killed by soft kill measures, 
and PK(ASCM-SK) is the reduction in the ship’s probability of killing the ASCM due to 
ASCM-initiated soft kill measures.  Hence, the ship soft kill features are additive to the 
probability of kill, while the ASCM soft kill measures are subtractive.  In the model, the 
ship soft kill probabilities are inserted in the “TARGET SHIP SOFT KILL” bar where 
they are added the probability of kill for the respective phases.  The soft kill probability is 
set to zero, when ship soft kill measures are assumed not to be employed. 
Notice that when an ASCM successfully completes its mission, it is always on a 
“kamikaze” mission and is destroyed in the end.  Hence, if costs are analyzed, the 
expected value of the ASCM in all missions is the full cost of the ASCM – regardless if it 
succeeds to the target or not; i.e., if an ASCM is launched, the total cost of the ASCM is 
expended.  This is different from an aircraft model, because aircraft are generally 
expected to have a plan to return from a mission (unless carrying out a kamikaze 
mission).  
15 




















































Figure 4.   @Risk decision tree model of ASCM vs. SAM. 






























































Figure 5.   @Risk decision tree model of ASCM vs SAM with soft kill elaborated. 
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2. Time Line Analysis 
The second type of analysis used in this study is the time line analysis.  This was 
done with Microsoft Excel using its calculation and graphing features.  The time line 
analysis gives a view of ASCM and defensive missile positions with respect to time.  An 
assumption is made that the ASCM will acquire its target and proceed directly to the 
target for a “hit” and potential “kill.”  The ASCM will be active for a determinate amount 
of time equal to the ASCM’s range divided by its speed.  In real life, the ASCM will have 
varied speeds throughout its profile, but, the overall average speed is used to simplify the 
problem.  Further, it is assumed that the ship’s weapon systems will take as many shots as 
possible when the ASCM is in the engagement envelope of the ship’s weapon system.  
When two systems could engage at the same time, the shorter range system is chosen to 
take the shot.  An example problem is depicted in Figure 6.  In this situation, the layered 
defense consists of a long range SAM (LRSAM), a short range SAM (SRSAM) and a 
Close-In Weapon System (CIWS).  In the example shown, an ASCM with a 100 km 
range is launched against a target ship with these defensive systems.  The ASCM’s time-
range profile is depicted by the single blue diagonal line with a negative slope going from 
left to right.  This represents the ASCM closing speed of 700 km/hr (.57 Mach).  The ship 
has many opportunities to launch its weapon systems against the ASCM in this scenario.  
These are depicted by the several color coded diagonal lines with positive slopes in 
Figure 6.  Since the ASCM Max range is within the firing envelope of the LRSAM, the 
LR SAM can engage the ASCM between its max range and min range.  In the example 
shown, the ship can launch its Mach 3.0 LRSAMs (pink lines in Figure 6).  When the 
ASCM reaches the maximum range of the SRSAM, the Mach 3.5 SRSAM (green lines in 
Figure 6) engage instead of the LRSAM.  Finally, the ASCM enters the CIWS range and 
is engaged by that system.  In this example, the slope of the SRSAM is steeper due to the 
higher Mach 3.5 speed of the SRSAM over the Mach 3.0 speed of the LRSAM.  In the 
example, each missile shot is assumed to be an independent event and is taken under a 
shoot-look-shoot policy.  A ten second reaction time between consecutive shots is 
assumed.  Under these conditions, if the ASCM survives, there are five possible shots 
from the SRSAM.  As in the case of the LRSAM, the ASCM eventually exits the 
17 
SRSAM envelope and enters the close-in weapon system envelope.  Hence the surviving 
ASCM goes through series of threats from the target ship;) three from the LRSAM,  five 
from the SRSAM, and finally from the CIWS.  The probability that an ASCM will killed 
is given by the multiplication of all the individual probabilities: 
(8)  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
* * * * * * * *K K K K K K K K K KP P P P P P P P P P=  
Where   
(9) 
1   /  
* *   78 K D LRSAM E LRSAM K H LRSAM at kmP P P P=  
(10) 
2   /  
* *   62 K D LRSAM E LRSAM K H LRSAM at kmP P P P=  
(11) 
3   /  
* *   47 K D LRSAM E LRSAM K H LRSAM at kmP P P P=  
(12) 
4   /  
* *   38 K D SRSAM E SRSAM K H SRSAM at kmP P P P=  
(13) 
5   /  
* *   30 K D SRSAM E SRSAM K H SRSAM at kmP P P P=  
(14) 
6   /  
* *   21 K D SRSAM E SRSAM K H SRSAM at kmP P P P=  
(15) 
7   /  
* *   16 K D SRSAM E SRSAM K H SRSAM at kmP P P P=  
(16) 
8   /  
* *   10 K D SRSAM E SRSAM K H SRSAM at kmP P P P=  
(17) 
9   /  
* *   2 K D CIWS E CIWS K H CIWS at kmP P P P=  
The ASCM’s survivability is the complement of the probability that it was killed, 
so the extension of Equation (6) for the multiple shots in this case is given by,: 
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Figure 6.   Generic time line diagram against a layered defense. 
The time-line analysis shows the effects of speed, range, and timing of each 
hypothetical scenario but it does not show the effect of RCS reductions or Electronic 
Countermeasures (ECM).  These effects are taken into account as a reduction in the 
probability of kill for each missile shot.  Time lines for the 19 missiles chosen for this 
project are shown in Table 25 through Table 33 in the Appendix. 
To complete the time line analysis, information on the maximum effective range 
and the radar horizon are needed.  Equations for these from Ball (2003) are:  
Radar Horizon  
In U.S. units: 
(19)
 ( )1.229H Antenna ASCMR h h= +  
where RH is the horizon range in nautical miles, hantenna is the height of target ship antenna 




 ( )4.124H Antenna ASCMR h h= +  
where RH is the horizon range in kilometers, hantenna is the height of target ship antenna in 
meters, and hASCM  is the altitude of the ASCM in meters. 
Radar Range Equation  
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⎡ ⎤= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  
Where Pr = Power at the receiver, Gr = Gain at the receiver, λ = wavelength of 
detecting radar, σ = RCS of item being detected,  Ls = Losses due to receiver path, La = 
Losses due to atmospheric conditions, N = Noise within receiver bandwidth, and 
(S/N)min= minimum detectable signal to noise ratio.  Many of these parameters are not 
readily available in the unclassified literature, so the following approach is used.  If the 
maximum range of a radar is known for a given radar for a specified target for a given 
false alarm rate and a given signal to noise ratio, the relationship between signal to noise 
ratio, maximum range, and RCS can be used to calculate values at different ranges, 
RCSs, and signal to noise ratios. 







σ⎡ ⎤∝ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  
Harney (2004) introduces a new term for the signal to noise ratio, the Carrier 
Noise Ratio (CNR), which is the ratio of the mean signal power divided by the mean 
noise power.  According to Harney, S/Nmin should be defined differently, and for the 
purposes of this analysis, CNR is equal to what most books call S/Nmin.  This paper uses 
the term CNR to be consistant with the Harney’s publication.  Hence, Equation (22) can 
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In the design of radars, two additional parameters are often combined with the 
CNR and provided as design specifications.  They are the probability of detection (PD), 
and the probability of false alarms (PF).  The relationships among CNR, PD, and PF are 
described as the Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) for a specific radar. 
For the purposes of this study, the assumption is made that all targets are 
fluctuating with Swerling II statistics.  This worst case assumption allows us to use the 
relationship of Equation 11.27 (Equation (25) ) and Figure 11–8 in Volume 1 of Harney 
2004 (Figure 7).  An example is shown for a system with a PD requirement of 90 percent 
and a PF requirement of less than 1x10-8 which gives a CNR of 22.4 decibels (dB).  These 
numbers can also be verified in equation form by using Equation (25). 
From Harney 2004, the receiver operating characteristics for a Swerling II Target 










Figure 11-8, Harney (2004),Combat Systems,  Vol. 1, pg 349  
Figure 7.   Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) for Swerling II targets. 
Two other calculations are useful in this analysis, the RCS of a sphere and a 
cylinder.  These calculations represent the extremes of the possible views that a radar 
would see against an incoming missile.  The sphere can be used to approximate missile 
RCS when the missile is head on into the target.  The head of the missile may actually be 
more of an ogive or cone which would reduce the reflection slightly.  There will also be 
additional reflections from the fins.  These two factors will be assumed to cancel each 
other in this analysis.  The cylinder represents an approximation for when the missile is 
climbing or descending and a plan-form is shown to the target platform.  Again, the 
additional inputs from the nose shape (causing a reduction) and fins (causing an increase) 
will be neglected. From Harney 2004, Volume 2, Table 2–2, the RCS of targets with 
spherical or cylindrical shapes can be estimated by: 
Maximum RCS of a sphere 
(26) 2aσ π ρ=  
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Where a is the radius of object being detected or one half of the diameter of the 
ASCM and ρ is the target reflectivity.  In most cases the target reflectivity can be 
assumed to be one. 
Maximum RCS of a Cylinder 
(27) 
22 L aπσ ρλ
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
Where the aspect is taken normal to the axis, L= length, a=radius, λ = wavelength, 
and ρ is the target reflectivity (assumed to be one).  For the cylinder, the maximum is 
achieved when the cylinder is orthogonal to the incoming RF energy.  
B. KILL CHAIN PROBABILITIES 
1. Probability of Detection 
To analyze this problem, data from various phases of the kill chain are necessary.  
The first factor in the chain is the probability of detection of the ASCM by the target ship.  
Two scenarios are investigated.  First, it is assumed that the ASCM can be detected at the 
maximum range of the ASCM and second, and more realistic, it is assumed that the 
ASCM will be detected at the radar horizon.  Variances in ASCM diameters will cause a 
variance in RCS and variances in RCS will cause variances in probability of detection.  
Probabilities of detection are estimated using the Carrier-to-Noise equation, Equation 
(25) above, from Harney 2004.  Probabilities of detection can be calculated for various 
ranges and various RCS values using the following equations.  From Equation (26) and 
assuming that the reflectivity coefficient ρ is 1.0: 
(28) 2aσ π=
   








σ σ σ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= =⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
  
Where a1 is the reference missile diameter and a2 is actual missile diameter of the 
missile of interest.  In this case, all of the missiles looked at are compared to a reference 
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missile’s diameter to get a relative measure of RCS for the particular missile.  Next, the 
effect of range on CNR needs to be calculated for various ranges of interest to the 
problem. 
To compare the same missile at two different ranges, from Equation (24): 
(30) 4CNR R
σ⎡ ⎤∝ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
  
To compare the CNR of a missile at two ranges R1 and R2, and knowing the CNR 






R RCNR CNR CNR
R R
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= =⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
  
From the relationships above, the specification that a radar can detect a one square 
meter RCS target at 167 kilometers with a false alarm probability of 1x10-8, and a 90-
percent probability of detection while providing a CNR of 22.4 dB, can be used to 
calculate other missiles’ probabilities of detection for their different RCS values and at 
other ranges.  This work is done in the spreadsheet Table 23 and Table 24 in Appendix A 
for the 19 ASCMs of this study and summarized in Table 3 
These estimated probabilities are based on size in relationship to the spherical 
model and range only because these are assumed to be the worst case scenarios.  Other 
factors such as different aspect ratios that would cause increased RCS are not addressed 






















































































































































Exocet MM38 X 35.0     3 0.9      167.0  40       24.1    131      52        35.4% 99.6% 100.0%
Exocet MM40 X 35.0     3 0.9      167.0  70       24.1    229      150      35.4% 96.7% 100.0%
Harpoon RGM‐84 X 34.3     3 0.8      167.0  140     24.1    509      421      34.0% 57.7% 99.9%
Sizzler (91RE2) SS‐N‐27 X 53.3     5 2.5      167.0  40       26.2    47        16        63.0% 99.8% 100.0%
Sizzler (3M‐14E) SS‐N‐27 X 53.3     5 0.9      167.0  300     26.2    981      895      63.0% 2.0% 100.0%
C‐802 [Ship] C‐802 X 36.0     3 0.9      167.0  120     24.1    416      332      37.4% 76.1% 100.0%
Styx SS‐N‐2 X 76.0     30 0.9      167.0  100     39.6    327      198      79.4% 97.0% 99.9%
Sunburn  (Kh‐41) SS‐N‐22 X X 76.0     3 3.0      167.0  100     24.1    98        74        79.4% 97.0% 100.0%
Switchblade SS‐N‐25 X X X 42.0     2 0.8      167.0  130     22.8    478      394      48.0% 75.8% 100.0%
RBS‐15 RBS‐15 X X X 50.0     9 0.9      167.0  150     29.4    491      395      59.2% 70.9% 99.9%
Sunburn (3M‐80E) SS‐N‐22 X X 130.0  20 3.0      167.0  120     35.4    118      83        92.4% 97.9% 100.0%
BrahMos PJ‐10 X X X X 67.0     5 2.0      167.0  290     26.2    427      388      74.4% 9.3% 100.0%
Harpoon UGM‐84 X 34.3     3 0.8      167.0  140     24.1    509      421      34.0% 57.7% 99.9%
Exocet SM39 X 35.0     3 0.9      167.0  50       24.1    164      85        35.4% 99.1% 100.0%
Silkworm CSS‐C‐2 X 76.0     100 0.8      167.0  100     58.2    368      154      79.4% 97.0% 99.7%
Sardine CSS‐C‐4 X 36.0     30 0.9      167.0  42       39.6    137      8           37.4% 99.6% 99.7%
Exocet AM39 X 35.0     3 0.9      167.0  70       24.1    229      150      35.4% 96.7% 100.0%
Harpoon AGM84 X 34.3     3 0.8      167.0  315     24.1    1,145  1,057  34.0% 0.0% 99.9%
C‐802  CAS‐8 X 36.0     3 0.9      167.0  130     24.1    450      367      37.4% 68.8% 100.0%  
Table 3.   Probability of Detection for Maximum Range and Radar Horizon 
2. Probability of Engagement 
The engagement phase is defined as the phase from the launch of the target ship’s 
defensive missile to the intercept point with the ASCM.  Factors affecting the 
engagement include obstacles to the target ship’s ability to control a missile to an 
intercept with the incoming ASCM.  A large obstacle that favors the ASCM over the 
target ship is the radar horizon.  This can be controlled by having low run-in attack 
profiles.  Another obstacle the ASCM can employ is speed.  Speed will affect the amount 
of time the target ship can devote to defeating the ASCM.  Another obstacle is range.  
The farther away the ASCM is from the target ship, the larger search is required by the 
target ship and the ASCM has a better chance of hiding its launch.  Potentially, the 
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ASCM can also induce RF or IR interference to the target ship in the way of jamming or 
adding decoys to confuse or detract the target ship from its mission of defending itself. 
Obstacles that need to be accounted for are the soft-kill features that could be 
emanating from the ASCM itself.  These would directly impact the defensive systems 
capability to track and engage the ASCM before it attacks the target ship.  Today’s 
ASCMs do not employ this feature, mostly because including jamming features or decoys 
on the ASCM itself would directly reduce the amount of explosives that it could carry 
and thereby reduce its lethality.  A more likely soft kill feature that may be employed is 
the launching of additional assets to help confuse the battle picture. Examples of possible 
assets are jamming platforms to support the ASCM attack or numerous credible decoys to 
overwhelm the ship’s defensive command and control infrastructure. 
An obstacle to the ASCM’s success in attacking the ship is the soft-kill capability 
of the target ship.  If the ship is jamming the ASCM missile seeker or launching chaff 
and/or decoys as a defense measure, the ASCM will need to take these features into 
account while prosecuting its target.  This affects the engagement phase because the 
ASCM may be denied or delayed in obtaining its target (the target ship) in parallel to the 
hard kill measures that the defensive missile systems are employing.  Hence the target 
ship could score a “mission success” (ASCM Killed) that is not related to the 
probabilities of success of the SAM kill chain.  This would be counted as a soft kill by 
the target ship which is not addressed in this part of the study. 
To handle the engagement phase, a simple model is used to develop an 
engagement envelope.  The model assumes that if the detection has occurred, a high 
probability of success will be achieved by the target ship’s defensive systems.  This 
probability is reduced somewhat as the defensive system is near its maximum range or 
near its minimum range.  These points are defined in the model and variations here can 
be assessed using the model.  Figure 8 shows the values used for the three defensive 
systems, the LRSAM, the SRSAM, and the CIWS.  To account for soft kill measures 
employed by the ASCM or its launch platform, the dashed lines are used.  For the 
































Range: LR SAM SR SAM CIWS
    Max Range 167.0  55.0    2.0      
    Min Range 10.0    1.5       ‐     
    Point 1 50.0    17.0    0.5      
    Point 2 127.0  43.0    1.5      
Probability:
    Maximum 90.0    95.0    95.0   
   Minimum‐ Low sid 50.0    85.0    95.0   
   Minimum ‐ High si 80.0    85.0    95.0   
    Slope ‐ Lo 1.0       0.6       ‐     
    Slope ‐ Hi (0.3)     (0.8)     ‐     
Soft‐Kill
    Soft‐Kill ‐ Detection 0.15    0.15    0.15   
    Soft‐Kill ‐ Engagem 0.10    0.10    0.10   
     Soft‐Kill ‐ Kill/Hit 0.05    0.05    0.05   
 
Figure 8.   Probability of engagement envelopes used for simulation 
3. Probability of Kill 
The “kill” phase assumes that the ASCM has been detected, and a missile has 
successfully engaged the ASCM to impact or to a lethal fusing range.  In most cases, an 
ASCM that has been successfully hit will not complete its mission and will be credited as 
a hard kill (mission success) to the target ship and a hard kill (mission failure) to the 
ASCM.  Typical vulnerability enhancements that might reduce the probability of ASCM 
kill include (from Ball 2003) adding extra armor with rugged construction, using non 
flammable components and fuel, and inclusion of redundancy in the design.  It is 
assumed that a design trade will be made to not overspend in these areas due to cost.  
These factors would add weight and complexity and potentially reduce the ASCMs 
capability to carry an effective payload to its target.  We assume these enhancements are 
not used by the ASCM, hence, a probability of kill of 95 percent is assumed across the 
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board for this part of the problem.  This number is reduced when soft-kill measures are 
present.  A 10 percent reduction is applied to account for this effect. 
C. DETAILS OF LINE DIAGRAM ANALYSIS 
1. Detection/Engagement Probabilities 
The spreadsheets shown in Table 23 and Table 24 of the appendix were used to 
calculate RCS and probability of detection at various ranges for the selected ASCMS.  
Table 23 uses Equations (19) through (31) to compute the probability of detection of an 
ASCM from the target ship’s radar system using the ASCM’s physical characteristics and 
expected target ship radar characteristics.  In this case, the ASCM characteristics used are 
its diameter (which provides a basis for calculating RCS), attack altitude (basis for radar 
horizon or detection range), and speed.  The ship characteristics used are radar mast 
altitude (basis for radar horizon), and radar detection specifications (probability of 
detection for a one square meter RCS target at 167 km is 90 percent with a probability of 
false alarms equal to 1x10-8).  The time-line diagrams Table 25 through Table 33 in the 
appendix were used to compute ranges that the target ship would use to defeat the 
incoming ASCM.  This information is compiled into the tables below.  Table 4 shows 
results of these calculations for range.  The column labeled “R1” displays the intercept 
ranges for the first missile fired at the ASCM.  The column labeled “R2” has the intercept 
range for the second missile, etc.  
Table 4 through Table 12 are color-coded similarly to the time-line diagrams in 
Figure 6 where pink represents the LRSAM engagement phase, green represents the 
SRSAM phase, and purple represents the CIWS phase.  Brown shading was added to 
represent conditions for which the ASCM is below the radar horizon from the perspective 
of the target ship.  For determining the radar horizon range, the target ship’s radar mast 
height was assumed to be 17 meters and the ASCM’s attack altitude in meters was used 
to calculate the radar horizon (Equation (20)).  This table highlights the speed and radar 
horizon features discussed earlier.  Slower and fatter ASCMs such as the Silkworm CSS-
C-2 are visible from a long range and the target ship defensive systems have numerous 
opportunities to kill it.  Short range missiles such as the Sizzler 91RE2 and Sardine are 
28 
never obstructed by the radar horizon, but the high speed (M2.5 vs. M.9) of the Sizzler 
reduces the opportunities to shoot it down.  Time line analysis indicates there are six shot 
opportunities against the Sardine compared to only three for the Sizzler. 
RANGE LRSAM SRSAM CIWS  Radar Horizon
Missile Version R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 RCIWS
Exocet MM38 32 23 16 9 5 2
Exocet SM39 42 38 19 12 8 2
Exocet MM40 56 40 30 20 14 8 2
Exocet AM39 56 40 30 20 14 8 2
Harpoon RGM‐84 103 78 55 39 25 18 9 2
Harpoon UGM‐84 103 78 55 39 25 18 9 2
Harpoon AGM84  140 99 74 55 40 28 10 2
Silkworm CSS‐C‐2 74 55 41 31 22 14 9 4 2
Sizzler (91RE2) SS‐N‐27 22 7 2
Sizzler (3M‐14E) SS‐N‐27 122 80 65 42 26 19 8 2
Saccade C‐802  CSSC‐8/CSS‐N‐8 84 55 40 30 20 12 9 2
Saccade C‐802  CAS‐8 97 72 54 38 29 20 14 8 2
Sardine CSS‐C‐4 33 23 15 9 4 2
Styx SS‐N‐2D 73 54 39 28 19 11 7 2
Sunburn (3M‐80E) SS‐N‐22 55 23 7 2
Sunburn (Kh‐41) SS‐N‐22 51 20 6 2
Switchblade SS‐N‐25 98 80 55 40 30 20 11 7 2
BrahMos PJ‐10 160 75 48 23 2
RBS‐15 Mk 2 RBS‐15 153 116 82 64 45 36 24 16 2  
Table 4.   Line diagram range results. 
Table 5 and Table 6 show the probabilities of detection for the matching range 
cells in Table 4.  Table 5 is for the case with no soft-kill mechanisms used by the ASCM 
and the numeric values do not take into account the radar horizon (despite the shading 
indicating over-the-horizon ranges).  Table 6 adds in a correction factor for soft-kill 
measures when they are are used.  In this case, a 15 percent drop in probability of 
detection is assumed.  Using the methodology described here, the probabilities of 
detection for all of the missiles by the time they reach the radar horizon are almost 1.0.  
This means that the ASCM must do something to mitigate detection or it will be shot 
down, barring errors from the target ship’s defensive team. 
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P(DETECTION) LRSAM SRSAM CIWS  Radar Horizon
Missile Version PD[R1] PD[R2] PD[R3] PD[R4] PD[R5] PD[R6] PD[R7] PD[R8] PD[RCIWS]
Exocet MM38 0.99862         0.99963         0.99991         0.99999         1.00000         0.95
Exocet SM39 0.99591         0.99726         0.99983         0.99997         0.99999         0.95
Exocet MM40 0.98713         0.99663         0.99893         0.99979         0.99999         0.95
Exocet AM39 0.98713         0.99663         0.99893         0.99979         0.99999         0.95
Harpoon RGM‐84 0.85800         0.95061         0.98753         0.99683         0.99946         0.99986         0.99999         0.95
Harpoon UGM‐84 0.85800         0.95061         0.98753         0.99683         0.99946         0.99986         0.99999         0.95
Harpoon AGM84  0.59902         0.87733         0.95978         0.98753         0.99649         0.99916         0.99999         0.95
Silkworm CSS‐C‐2 0.99166         0.99745       0.99921       0.99974       0.99993       0.99999       1.00000         1.000000       0.95
Sizzler (91RE2) SS‐N‐27 0.99987         1.00000       0.95
Sizzler (3M‐14E) SS‐N‐27 0.88247         0.97702       0.99359       0.99767       0.99974       0.99993       1.00000         0.95
Saccade C‐802  CSSC‐8/CSS‐N‐8 0.94006         0.98867         0.99682         0.99899         0.99980         0.99997         0.99999         0.95
Saccade C‐802  CAS‐8 0.89618         0.96714         0.98947         0.99741         0.99912         0.99980         0.99995         0.99999         0.95
Sardine CSS‐C‐4 0.99852         0.99965       0.99994       0.99999       1.00000       0.95
Styx SS‐N‐2D 0.99210         0.99763       0.99935       0.99983       0.99996       0.999996     0.999999       0.95
Sunburn (3M‐80E) SS‐N‐22 0.99876         1.00000         0.95
Sunburn (Kh‐41) SS‐N‐22 0.99811         0.99993         0.95
Switchblade SS‐N‐25 0.91941         0.97574         0.99166         0.99766         0.99926         0.99985         0.99999         0.95
BrahMos PJ‐10 0.79239         0.98869       0.99809       0.99978       0.95
RBS‐15 Mk 2 RBS‐15 0.70668         0.88307         0.97127         0.98923         0.99736         0.99892         0.99977         0.99996         0.95  
Table 5.   Line diagram probability of detection results. 
 
P(DETECTION‐SK) LRSAM SRSAM CIWS  Radar Horizon
Missile Version PD[R1] PD[R2] PD[R3] PD[R4] PD[R5] PD[R6] PD[R7] PD[R8] PD[RCIWS]
Exocet MM38 0.84862         0.84963         0.84991         0.84999         0.85000         0.80
Exocet SM39 0.84591         0.84726         0.84983         0.84997         0.84999         0.80
Exocet MM40 0.83713         0.84663         0.84893         0.84979         0.84999         0.80
Exocet AM39 0.83713         0.84663         0.84893         0.84979         0.84999         0.80
Harpoon RGM‐84 0.70800         0.80061         0.83753         0.84683         0.84946         0.84986         0.84999         0.80
Harpoon UGM‐84 0.70800         0.80061         0.83753         0.84683         0.84946         0.84986         0.84999         0.80
Harpoon AGM84  0.44902         0.72733         0.80978         0.83753         0.84649         0.84916         0.84999         0.80
Silkworm CSS‐C‐2 0.84166         0.84745       0.84921       0.84974       0.84993       0.84999       0.85000         0.85000         0.80
Sizzler (91RE2) SS‐N‐27 0.84987         0.85000       0.80
Sizzler (3M‐14E) SS‐N‐27 0.73247         0.82702       0.84359       0.84767       0.84974       0.84993       0.85000         0.80
Saccade C‐802  CSSC‐8/CSS‐N‐8 0.79006         0.83867         0.84682         0.84899         0.84980         0.84997         0.84999         0.80
Saccade C‐802  CAS‐8 0.74618         0.81714         0.83947         0.84741         0.84912         0.84980         0.84995         0.84999         0.80
Sardine CSS‐C‐4 0.84852         0.84965       0.84994       0.84999       0.85000       0.80
Styx SS‐N‐2D 0.84210         0.84763       0.84935       0.84983       0.84996       0.85000       0.85000         0.80
Sunburn (3M‐80E) SS‐N‐22 0.84876         0.85000         0.80
Sunburn (Kh‐41) SS‐N‐22 0.84811         0.84993         0.80
Switchblade SS‐N‐25 0.76941         0.82574         0.84166         0.84766         0.84926         0.84985         0.84999         0.80
BrahMos PJ‐10 0.64239         0.83869       0.84809       0.84978       0.80
RBS‐15 Mk 2 RBS‐15 0.55668         0.73307         0.82127         0.83923         0.84736         0.84892         0.84977         0.84996         0.80  
Table 6.   Line diagram probability of detection results with soft kill. 
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2. Engagement Probabilities 
Figure 8 shows the probabilities attributed to the engagement phase for the three 
target ship defensive systems.  These parameters are mapped into Table 7 and Table 8 in 
the same way that the detection probabilities were.  The same color coding scheme 
applies.  Table 7 represents the values if no soft kill is assumed and Table 8 assumes a 10 
percent degradation due to soft-kill. 
P(ENGAGEMENT) LRSAM SRSAM CIWS  Radar Horizon
Missile Version PE[R1] PE[R2] PE[R3] PE[R4] PE[R5] PE[R6] PE[R7] PE[R8] PE[RCIWS]
Exocet MM38 0.95000         0.95000         0.94355         0.89839         0.87258         0.95
Exocet SM39 0.95000         0.95000         0.95000         0.91774         0.89194         0.95
Exocet MM40 0.90000         0.95000         0.95000         0.95000         0.93065         0.89194         0.95
Exocet AM39 0.90000         0.95000         0.95000         0.95000         0.93065         0.89194         0.95
Harpoon RGM‐84 0.90000         0.90000         0.85000         0.95000         0.95000         0.95000         0.89839         0.95
Harpoon UGM‐84 0.90000         0.90000         0.85000         0.95000         0.95000         0.95000         0.89839         0.95
Harpoon AGM84  0.86750         0.90000         0.90000         0.85000         0.95000         0.95000         0.90484         0.95
Silkworm CSS‐C‐2 0.90000         0.85000       0.95000       0.95000       0.95000       0.93065       0.89839         0.86613         0.95
Sizzler (91RE2) SS‐N‐27 0.95000         0.88548       0.95
Sizzler (3M‐14E) SS‐N‐27 0.90000         0.90000       0.90000       0.95000       0.95000       0.95000       0.89194         0.95
Saccade C‐802  CSSC‐8/CSS‐N‐8 0.90000         0.85000         0.95000         0.95000         0.95000         0.91774         0.89839         0.95
Saccade C‐802  CAS‐8 0.90000         0.90000         0.85833         0.95000         0.95000         0.95000         0.93065         0.89194         0.95
Sardine CSS‐C‐4 0.95000         0.95000       0.93710       0.89839       0.86613       0.95
Styx SS‐N‐2D 0.90000         0.85833       0.95000       0.95000       0.95000       0.91129       0.88548         0.95
Sunburn (3M‐80E) SS‐N‐22 0.85000         0.95000         0.88548         0.95
Sunburn (Kh‐41) SS‐N‐22 0.88333         0.95000         0.87903         0.95
Switchblade SS‐N‐25 0.90000         0.90000         0.85000         0.95000         0.95000         0.95000         0.91129         0.88548         0.95
BrahMos PJ‐10 0.81750         0.90000       0.90833       0.95000       0.95
RBS‐15 Mk 2 RBS‐15 0.83500         0.90000         0.90000         0.90000         0.93333         0.95000         0.95000         0.94355         0.95  
Table 7.   Line diagram probability of engagement results. 
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P(ENGAGEMENT‐SK) LRSAM SRSAM CIWS  Radar Horizon
Missile Version PE[R1] PE[R2] PE[R3] PE[R4] PE[R5] PE[R6] PE[R7] PE[R8] PE[RCIWS]
Exocet MM38 0.85000         0.85000         0.84355         0.79839         0.77258         0.85
Exocet SM39 0.85000         0.85000         0.85000         0.81774         0.79194         0.85
Exocet MM40 0.80000         0.85000         0.85000         0.85000         0.83065         0.79194         0.85
Exocet AM39 0.80000         0.85000         0.85000         0.85000         0.83065         0.79194         0.85
Harpoon RGM‐84 0.80000         0.80000         0.75000         0.85000         0.85000         0.85000         0.79839         0.85
Harpoon UGM‐84 0.80000         0.80000         0.75000         0.85000         0.85000         0.85000         0.79839         0.85
Harpoon AGM84  0.76750         0.80000         0.80000         0.75000         0.85000         0.85000         0.80484         0.85
Silkworm CSS‐C‐2 0.80000         0.75000       0.85000       0.85000       0.85000       0.83065       0.79839         0.76613         0.85
Sizzler (91RE2) SS‐N‐27 0.85000         0.78548       0.85
Sizzler (3M‐14E) SS‐N‐27 0.80000         0.80000       0.80000       0.85000       0.85000       0.85000       0.79194         0.85
Saccade C‐802  CSSC‐8/CSS‐N‐8 0.80000         0.75000         0.85000         0.85000         0.85000         0.81774         0.79839         0.85
Saccade C‐802  CAS‐8 0.80000         0.80000         0.75833         0.85000         0.85000         0.85000         0.83065         0.79194         0.85
Sardine CSS‐C‐4 0.85000         0.85000       0.83710       0.79839       0.76613       0.85
Styx SS‐N‐2D 0.80000         0.75833       0.85000       0.85000       0.85000       0.81129       0.78548         0.85
Sunburn (3M‐80E) SS‐N‐22 0.75000         0.85000         0.78548         0.85
Sunburn (Kh‐41) SS‐N‐22 0.78333         0.85000         0.77903         0.85
Switchblade SS‐N‐25 0.80000         0.80000         0.75000         0.85000         0.85000         0.85000         0.81129         0.78548         0.85
BrahMos PJ‐10 0.71750         0.80000       0.80833       0.85000       0.85
RBS‐15 Mk 2 RBS‐15 0.73500         0.80000         0.80000         0.80000         0.83333         0.85000         0.85000         0.84355         0.85  
Table 8.   Line diagram probability of engagement results with soft kill. 
3. Kill/Hit Probabilities 
Table 9 shows the probabilities attributed to the kill, given a hit, phase for the 
three target ship defensive systems.  These parameters are mapped into Table 9 and Table 
10 in the same way that the detection and engagement probabilities and were.  The same 
color coding scheme applies.  Table 9 represents the values if no soft kill is assumed and 
Table 10 assumes 5 percent degradation due to soft-kill. 
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P (KILL/HIT) LRSAM SRSAM CIWS  Radar Horizon
Missile Version PKH[R1] PKH[R2] PKH[R3] PKH[R4] PKH[R5] PKH[R6] PKH[R7] PKH[R8] PKH[RCIWS]
Exocet MM38 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.99
Exocet SM39 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.99
Exocet MM40 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.99
Exocet AM39 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.99
Harpoon RGM‐84 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.99
Harpoon UGM‐84 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.99
Harpoon AGM84  0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.99
Silkworm CSS‐C‐2 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.99
Sizzler (91RE2) SS‐N‐27 0.95 0.95 0.99
Sizzler (3M‐14E) SS‐N‐27 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.99
Saccade C‐802  CSSC‐8/CSS‐N‐8 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.99
Saccade C‐802  CAS‐8 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.99
Sardine CSS‐C‐4 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.99
Styx SS‐N‐2D 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.99
Sunburn (3M‐80E) SS‐N‐22 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.99
Sunburn (Kh‐41) SS‐N‐22 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.99
Switchblade SS‐N‐25 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.99
BrahMos PJ‐10 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.99
RBS‐15 Mk 2 RBS‐15 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.99  
Table 9.   Line diagram probability of kill/hit results. 
 
P(KILL/HIT‐SK) LRSAM SRSAM CIWS  Radar Horizon
Missile Version PKH[R1] PKH[R2] PKH[R3] PKH[R4] PKH[R5] PKH[R6] PKH[R7] PKH[R8] PKH[RCIWS]
Exocet MM38 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.94
Exocet SM39 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.94
Exocet MM40 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.94
Exocet AM39 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.94
Harpoon RGM‐84 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.94
Harpoon UGM‐84 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.94
Harpoon AGM84  0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.94
Silkworm CSS‐C‐2 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.94
Sizzler (91RE2) SS‐N‐27 0.9 0.9 0.94
Sizzler (3M‐14E) SS‐N‐27 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.94
Saccade C‐802  CSSC‐8/CSS‐N‐8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.94
Saccade C‐802  CAS‐8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.94
Sardine CSS‐C‐4 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.94
Styx SS‐N‐2D 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.94
Sunburn (3M‐80E) SS‐N‐22 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.94
Sunburn (Kh‐41) SS‐N‐22 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.94
Switchblade SS‐N‐25 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.94
BrahMos PJ‐10 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.94
RBS‐15 Mk 2 RBS‐15 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.94  
Table 10.   Line diagram probability of kill/hit results with soft kill. 
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4. Survivability Probabilities 
After the probabilities from each phase for each defensive attempt are captured; 
the overall probability of kill can be computed by multiplying the probability result of 
each missile.  The equation for this is: 
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where 
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n is the “nth” range point for each missile an N is the last system to engage the ASCM.  
From this data, the survivability can be computed using Equation(18): 
(34)  ( )1 21 * *...*1S nKPP P P P= −− =  
Table 11 and Table 12 show the probabilities of survival for the ASCM with 
respect to each individual target ship’s defensive missile shot.  It includes the 
probabilities of detection, engagement, and kill, given a hit.  These probabilities are 
mapped in the same way that the detection and engagement probabilities were in the 
previous tables.  The same color coding scheme applies.  Table 11 represents the values if 
no soft kill is assumed and Table 12 assumes the soft kill degradations by phase have 





LRSAM SRSAM CIWS  Radar Horizon
Missile Version PS[R1] PS[R2] PS[R3] PS[R4] PS[R5] PS[R6] PS[R7] PS[R8] PS[RCIWS]
Exocet MM38 0.098746149 0.097832756 0.103706443 0.146539637 0.17104907 0.11               
Exocet SM39 0.101192438 0.099976144 0.09765498 0.128168985 0.152665864 0.11               
Exocet MM40 0.15600168 0.100539001 0.098462788 0.097690271 0.115894741 0.11               
Exocet AM39 0.15600168 0.100539001 0.098462788 0.097690271 0.115894741 0.11               
Harpoon RGM‐84 0.266411544 0.187227929 0.202568827 0.100359862 0.097983595 0.097629989 0.146540509 0.11               
Harpoon UGM‐84 0.266411544 0.187227929 0.202568827 0.100359862 0.097983595 0.097629989 0.146540509 0.11               
Harpoon AGM84  0.506333775 0.249882984 0.179390852 0.202568827 0.100664064 0.098260816 0.140415891 0.11               
Silkworm CSS‐C‐2 0.152132504 0.194562254 0.098212454 0.097732914 0.097559086 0.115896589 0.146533939 0.177177478 0.11             
Sizzler (91RE2) SS‐N‐27 0.097620128 0.15879147 0.11             
Sizzler (3M‐14E) SS‐N‐27 0.245488737 0.164646119 0.150478586 0.099600263 0.097734323 0.097566831 0.152663408 0.11             
Saccade C‐802  CSSC‐8/CSS‐N‐8 0.196245752 0.201646185 0.100372807 0.098410072 0.097679848 0.12816768 0.146539748 0.11               
Saccade C‐802  CAS‐8 0.233769073 0.173096913 0.193169414 0.099840686 0.098294719 0.097679848 0.115932525 0.152665613 0.11               
Sardine CSS‐C‐4 0.098832091 0.097814529 0.109814201 0.146539233 0.17717806 0.11             
Styx SS‐N‐2D 0.151756367 0.186518628 0.09808333 0.097655025 0.097532871 0.134277736 0.158790929 0.11             
Sunburn (3M‐80E) SS‐N‐22 0.193498975 0.097500862 0.11               
Sunburn (Kh‐41) SS‐N‐22 0.162418366 0.097559086 0.11               
Switchblade SS‐N‐25 0.213906416 0.165743748 0.199230891 0.099611623 0.098168724 0.097632137 0.134286649 0.11               
BrahMos PJ‐10 0.384610545 0.154667585 0.138728903 0.097699466 0.11             
RBS‐15 Mk 2 RBS‐15 0.439427226 0.244972849 0.169562418 0.15420732 0.115677696 0.098478245 0.097707596 0.103666965 0.11                 
Table 11.   Probability of survivability. 
 
P(SURVIVABILITY‐SK) LRSAM SRSAM CIWS  Radar Horizon
Missile Version PS[R1] PS[R2] PS[R3] PS[R4] PS[R5] PS[R6] PS[R7] PS[R8] PS[RCIWS]
Exocet MM38 0.350806293 0.350032059 0.354751048 0.389240084 0.408976379 0.36
Exocet SM39 0.352879878 0.351848892 0.349881368 0.37444753 0.394173202 0.36
Exocet MM40 0.397264573 0.352325996 0.350566103 0.349911282 0.364562915 0.36
Exocet AM39 0.397264573 0.352325996 0.350566103 0.349911282 0.364562915 0.36
Harpoon RGM‐84 0.4902413 0.423560362 0.434666666 0.352174149 0.350159917 0.349860184 0.389240817 0.36
Harpoon UGM‐84 0.4902413 0.423560362 0.434666666 0.352174149 0.350159917 0.349860184 0.389240817 0.36
Harpoon AGM84  0.689840384 0.476322513 0.416960717 0.434666666 0.352432005 0.350394902 0.38430906 0.36
Silkworm CSS‐C‐2 0.394006319 0.427973866 0.350353908 0.349947429 0.349800084 0.364564478 0.389235286 0.41391134 0.36
Sizzler (91RE2) SS‐N‐27 0.349851826 0.399105803 0.36
Sizzler (3M‐14E) SS‐N‐27 0.472622095 0.4045441 0.392613546 0.351530278 0.349948623 0.349806649 0.394171136 0.36
Saccade C‐802  CSSC‐8/CSS‐N‐8 0.431154317 0.433895418 0.352185122 0.350521419 0.349902447 0.374446429 0.389240177 0.36
Saccade C‐802  CAS‐8 0.462752904 0.411660559 0.42706151 0.351734072 0.35042364 0.349902447 0.364594864 0.394172991 0.36
Sardine CSS‐C‐4 0.350879141 0.350016609 0.359668474 0.389239743 0.413911827 0.36
Styx SS‐N‐2D 0.393689572 0.421494833 0.350244457 0.349881406 0.349777863 0.379365891 0.399105348 0.36
Sunburn (3M‐80E) SS‐N‐22 0.427085056 0.349750731 0.36
Sunburn (Kh‐41) SS‐N‐22 0.402081616 0.349800084 0.36
Switchblade SS‐N‐25 0.446026455 0.405468419 0.431876441 0.351539907 0.350316841 0.349862005 0.379373409 0.36
BrahMos PJ‐10 0.585177014 0.396141124 0.383012332 0.349919076 0.36
RBS‐15 Mk 2 RBS‐15 0.631757127 0.472187662 0.408684142 0.395753533 0.364483014 0.350579205 0.349925967 0.354717611 0.36  




After multiplying the probability values, the results of Table 13 are obtained.  The 
first column labeled Ps gives the result if over-the-horizon shots by the defending ship 
could be made throughout the ASCM profile when it is launched at its maximum range.  
The second column, Ps-Rh, gives the probabilities of survival if shots are only taken when 
the target ship can see the ASCM with its onboard radar.  Columns 3 and 4 present the 
same data, but with soft kill measures factored in. 
ASCM 
Missile Version PS PS_RH PS_SK PS_SK_RH
Exocet MM38 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 0.7%
Exocet SM39 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 1.9%
Exocet MM40 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 4.6%
Exocet AM39 0.0% 0.1% 0.2% 4.6%
Harpoon RGM‐84 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 4.9%
Harpoon UGM‐84 0.0% 0.2% 0.1% 4.9%
Harpoon AGM84  0.0% 1.5% 0.1% 0.0%
Silkworm CSS‐C‐2 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Sizzler (91RE2) SS‐N‐27 0.2% 0.2% 5.0% 5.0%
Sizzler (3M‐14E) SS‐N‐27 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.7%
Saccade C‐802  CSSC‐8/CSS‐N‐8 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.8%
Saccade C‐802  CAS‐8 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Sardine CSS‐C‐4 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 0.3%
Styx SS‐N‐2D 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2%
Sunburn (3M‐80E) SS‐N‐22 0.2% 1.0% 5.4% 12.6%
Sunburn (Kh‐41) SS‐N‐22 0.2% 9.8% 5.1% 0.6%
Switchblade SS‐N‐25 0.0% 1.3% 0.0% 4.8%
BrahMos PJ‐10 0.0% 1.0% 1.1% 35.0%
RBS‐15 Mk 2 RBS‐15 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 4.5%
with Soft‐KillSurvivability
 
Table 13.   Summary of probability results for ASCM survivability. 
D. DETAILS OF MONTE CARLO ANALYSIS 
1. Probability Derivation 
A Monte Carlo simulation was undertaken as a means to estimate the combined 
effects of the kill chain phases described above.  The advantage of a Monte Carlo 
simulation over a simple multiplication of probabilities is that it provides the probability 
distribution of the output.  The simulation provides point estimates for overall ASCM 
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survivability, as well as other statistics (maximum, minimum, standard deviation, etc.).  
The inputs to the Monte Carlo simulation are the probabilities for each phase in the kill 
chain, which were randomized using the probability distributions described below.  The 
outputs are estimates of overall ASCM survivability probabilities and their statistics. 
One benefit of using decision tree software is that it facilitates doing a Monte 
Carlo simulation to provide insight on of probability characteristics that can be expected 
using the assumptions made.  The decision tree software allows any variable in the tree to 
be varied using standard or self defined probability distribution.  In the decision tree 
model, there are a couple of candidates for using this capability.  Each SAM shot is an 
independent event that has a probability associated with its potential for success.  Soft kill 
measures can also be applied and an associated probability can be given to its affect.  
Since the SAM shots against the ASCM are discrete, independent events that have only 
two possible results – success (ASCM Killed) or failure (ASCM Survives).  This picture 
is true for each phase of the intercept.  In the detection phase, the ASCM is either 
detected or not detected; in the engagement phase, the ASCM is either engaged by the 
SAM system or not engaged; and in the Kill/Hit phase, it either reaches the intercept and 
kills the ASCM or it doesn’t.  Further, a probability of success (or failure) can be 
attributed to each phase of the intercept.  Hence a binomial distribution is appropriate for 
simulation of each phase of the SAM intercept with the ASCM.  The soft kill measures, 
on the other hand, provide a different probability situation to the problem.  There are two 
different soft kill measures that should be addressed.  First, there is the soft kill measure 
attributed to the ship’s defense that are working in parallel with the SAM to prevent the 
ASCM from attacking the ship.  Second, there are soft kill measures associated with the 
ASCM attack to enhance its success in attacking the ship.  As stated earlier, these 
measures are more likely to be on other platforms and not on the ASCM, but their effect 
on the problem is the same.  The ASCM-side soft kill measures are additive to the 
ASCM’s success where the target ship-side soft kill measures are subtractive to the 
ASCM’s success.  In the decision model, the ASCM-side soft kill measures are included 
in the down sloping decisions and can be mapped into the four categories shown; ECM, 
RF Decoy, IR/UV decoy, and “other” which is used to catch any other measure such as 
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luck.  The target ship-side soft kill measures are included in the bar at the top and added 
to the probability equations on the upward branches of the decision model.  For the 
purposes of the study, the ASCM-side soft kill measures are added to the model directly 
by phase.  This is similar to the approach taken in the time line analysis and restricts the 
soft kill probability values in the problem to the kill side of the decision tree.  In one 
analysis case, the ship side soft kill measures are also allowed to vary.  These are varied 
by assuming a normal distribution around the expected probability value with a standard 
deviation equal to one third of the probability value.  
For the binomial distributions of the three phases, probability of detection values 
were taken from the time line analysis.  In most cases there were several shots taken 
against the ASCM, hence only the first shot after the ASCM breaks through the radar 
horizon was used for modeling and simulating each ASCM.  The timeline values for this 
range were taken for the probability of detection, probability of engagement, and the 
probability of kill given a hit.  A binomial distribution asks for two inputs, “n” and “P.”  
P values were directly inserted as described above.  Values for “n” were chosen from 
looking at the time line analysis.  Since most shots were taken by the SRSAM, a decision 
was made to use only the SRSAM probability distribution and shot numbers. The value 
inserted for n was the number of shots that the SRSAM would take in the time line 
analysis, even though the simulation is only addressing one shot – the shot after breaking 
through the radar horizon.  The other parameter needed for a Monte Carlo analysis is the 
number of simulations to carry out.  According to www.janes.com, a similar missile, the 
Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) is expected to have a total production of three 
thousand.  An arbitrary decision to use one third of that amount or one thousand trials 
was used in the simulation for each missile.  The base probabilities for each phase of each 
missile engagement are listed in Table 14.  The number of shots taken from the time line 
analysis is listed in the first three columns following the ASCM name and version 
(columns 3–5).  The LRSAM shots and the SRSAM shots are tallied separately then 
totaled in the fifth column.  As stated earlier, the model uses the SRSAM column values 
for n.  The next three columns are probabilities of kill for the three phases that are 
inserted into the decision tree model.  The last three columns show the probabilities 
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adjusted for ASCM-side soft kill measures.  The same degradation values for the ASCM 
soft kill phase that were used in the timeline analysis were used in the Monte Carlo 
simulation.  A fifteen percent reduction was assumed for detection, ten percent for 
engagement, and ten percent for kill, given a hit.  The results of the Monte Carlo 
simulations for the selected ASCMs are included in the appendix in Table 34 through 
Table 67 and summarized in Table 15.  Note that the results of Table 15 need to be 
compared to the result single shot result in Table 11 and Table 12 that gives the result for 
the first shot taken after passing the radar horizon because that is where the Monte Carlo 











PD PE PH/K PD PE PH/K
Exocet MM38 5   5   0.9996  0.95 0.95 0.8496  0.85      0.90     
Exocet SM39 5   5   0.9998  0.95 0.95 0.8498  0.85      0.90     
Exocet MM40  1   4   5   0.9998  0.95 0.95 0.8498  0.85      0.90     
Exocet AM39  1   4   5   0.9998  0.95 0.95 0.8498  0.85      0.90     
Harpoon RGM‐84 2   5   7   0.9999  0.95 0.95 0.8499  0.85      0.90     
Harpoon UGM‐84 2   5   7   0.9999  0.95 0.95 0.8499  0.85      0.90     
Harpoon AGM84 3   4   7   1.0000  0.95 0.95 0.8500  0.85      0.90     
Silkworm CSS‐C‐2 1   7 8 0.9974 0.95 0.95 0.8474 0.85      0.90     
Sizzler (91RE2) SS‐N‐27 2 2 0.9999 0.95 0.95 0.8499 0.85      0.90     
Sizzler (3M‐14E) SS‐N‐27 3   4 7 0.9997 0.95 0.95 0.8497 0.85      0.90     
Saccade C‐802  CSSC‐8 1   6   7   0.9998  0.95 0.95 0.8498  0.85      0.90     
Saccade C‐802  CAS‐8 2   6   8   0.9998  0.95 0.95 0.8498  0.85      0.90     
Sardine CSS‐C‐4 5 5 0.9985 0.95 0.95 0.8485 0.85      0.90     
Styx SS‐N‐2d 1   6 7 0.9994 0.95 0.95 0.8494 0.85      0.90     
Sunburn (3M‐80E) SS‐N‐22 1   1   2   1.0000  0.95 0.95 0.8500  0.85      0.90     
Sunburn (Kh‐41) SS‐N‐22 2   2   0.9999  0.95 0.95 0.8499  0.85      0.90     
Switchblade SS‐N‐25 2   5   7   0.9999  0.95 0.95 0.8499  0.85      0.90     
BrahMos PJ‐10 2   2 4 0.9998 0.95 0.95 0.8498 0.85      0.90     









































































Exocet MM38 5             0.000% 76.000% 9.720% 0.13184    27.325% 75.775% 35.023% 0.10171    0.300% 61.603% 11.385% 0.12706   
Exocet MM40 4             0.000% 75.000% 9.713% 0.14965    27.325% 84.700% 34.932% 0.11771    0.300% 73.442% 12.840% 0.14219   
Exocet SM39 5             0.000% 75.000% 9.756% 0.14668    27.325% 80.875% 34.996% 0.10312    0.300% 65.117% 12.776% 0.12790   
Exocet AM39 4             0.000% 75.000% 9.713% 0.14965    27.325% 84.700% 34.932% 0.11771    0.300% 73.442% 12.840% 0.14219   
Harpoon RGM‐84 5             0.000% 60.000% 9.776% 0.13074    27.325% 85.975% 34.984% 0.10289    0.300% 65.265% 12.778% 0.12814   
Harpoon UGM‐84 5             0.000% 60.000% 9.776% 0.13074    27.325% 85.975% 34.984% 0.10289    0.300% 65.265% 12.778% 0.12814   
Harpoon AGM84 4             0.000% 75.000% 9.731% 0.14828    31.150% 77.900% 38.555% 0.11092    0.300% 76.369% 11.589% 0.14320   
Silkworm CSS‐C‐2 7             0.000% 59.184% 9.992% 0.11131    27.325% 80.233% 35.186% 0.08769    0.300% 52.384% 11.491% 0.10633   
Sizzler (91RE2) SS‐N‐27 2             0.000% 100.000% 9.900% 0.20825    27.325% 84.700% 34.727% 0.15555    0.300% 99.561% 11.273% 0.20143   
Sizzler (3M‐14E) SS‐N‐27 4             0.000% 75.000% 9.819% 0.14530    31.150% 88.525% 38.616% 0.11312    0.300% 81.068% 11.598% 0.14598   
Saccade C‐802 C‐802 6             0.000% 66.667% 9.778% 0.12193    27.325% 81.158% 35.026% 0.09322    0.300% 59.318% 11.272% 0.11982   
Saccade C‐802  CAS‐8 6             0.000% 66.667% 9.742% 0.12151    27.325% 73.367% 34.962% 0.09429    0.300% 67.901% 11.287% 0.11639   
Sardine CSS‐C‐4 5             0.000% 64.000% 9.912% 0.13136    27.325% 75.775% 35.111% 0.10311    0.300% 69.215% 11.384% 0.13080   
Styx SS‐N‐2 6             0.000% 66.667% 9.803% 0.12371    27.325% 71.950% 35.061% 0.09225    0.300% 57.841% 12.723% 0.11764   
Sunburn (3M‐80E) SS‐N‐22 1             0.000% 100.000% 9.800% 0.29746    27.325% 27.325% 27.325% ‐             0.300% 99.965% 5.755% 0.18948   
Sunburn  (Kh‐41) SS‐N‐22 2             0.000% 100.000% 9.850% 0.20879    27.325% 84.700% 34.818% 0.15661    0.300% 99.817% 11.334% 0.20134   
Switchblade SS‐N‐25 5             0.000% 60.000% 9.788% 0.13151    27.325% 80.875% 34.979% 0.10420    0.300% 69.666% 12.800% 0.12635   
BrahMos PJ‐10 2             0.000% 100.000% 9.700% 0.20739    27.325% 84.700% 34.673% 0.15616    0.300% 99.411% 11.283% 0.20381   
RBS‐15 RBS‐15 4             0.000% 62.500% 9.806% 0.14422    31.150% 91.713% 38.589% 0.11154    0.300% 62.846% 11.635% 0.13944   
ASCM ONLY ASCM + ASCM SK ASCM + ASCM SK + SHIP SK
 
Table 15.   Summary of Monte Carlo Probability of Survivability Results (1,000 Runs). 
E. DATA ANALYSIS SUMMARY 
1. Timeline Analysis 
The time line analysis provides a response to the question “How many missiles 
could logically be used against an incoming ASCM?”  From the analysis results and 
given assumptions, a highly capable target ship would have a high probability of success 
against the majority of ASCMs considered in the analysis.   
The timeline analysis provided insight into the effects of ASCM radar cross 
section (RCS), speed, and use of countermeasures (soft-kill techniques) on the ability of 
the ASCM to penetrate shipboard defenses.  An ASCM designer can use RCS to 
minimize its exposure, but a difference of at least one order of magnitude is needed to 
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have any significance.  The difference in probability of detection for the very large, 130 
cm diameter Sunburn (probability of detection at 35 km equals .979) and a much smaller 
35 cm diameter Exocet MM-38 (probability of detection at 24 km equals .996) is 
statistically insignificant.  Using the RCS-radar range model and Microsoft Excel’s “goal 
seek” feature, an ASCM diameter can be found to meet criteria where a chance of 
survival is possible.  Using 90 percent probability of kill by the target ship SAM as the 
break point, an ASCM would have to have an RCS equivalent to that of a missile with a 
diameter of 2.4 cm to achieve the 90 percent probability of detection using the spherical 
model.  In reality, making the ASCM that small is not an option and other RCS reduction 
measures such as using radar absorbing materials and shape modifications are more likely 
to be seen. 
Speed provided a bigger impact on ASCM survivability and success than RCS.  
From the data, the high speed ASCMs all had very limited number of potential intercepts.  
Since the probabilities are multiplicative, the probability of survivability increases as 
fewer target ship defensive missile shots are taken against the ASCM, thereby increasing 
the ASCMs probability of survival. 
If soft kill measures can be employed in support of the ASCM, the probability of 
kill for the target ship defensive system is reduced and the ASCM’s survivability is 
enhanced even more.  In the analysis results, the high speed Sizzler 91RE2, Sunburn 3M-
80E, Sunburn Hh-41 and the Brahmos ASCMs clearly demonstrate this characteristic.  
Although there was no significant difference for the first defensive missile shot, 
shortening the kill chain and adding soft kill measures had a big impact on the Sunburn 
3M-80E and the Brahmos where the relatively small decrease in probability due to soft 
kill raises their chances of surviving from around zero to 15 percent and 39 percent 
respectively.  
Table 16 summarizes the comparisons in the data with respect to operational 
scenario, speed, size, and radar horizon.  It can be seen here that operational scenario and 
size did not create big differences.  Differences were only substantial when range was 
limited to the radar horizon and the ASCM incorporated soft kill measures.  Under these 
circumstances, only “speed greater than M1.0” breaks out with a greater than ten percent 
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difference in the probability of success – again only in the case where the engagement 
was limited by the radar horizon and soft kill enhancements by the ASCM side are 
present. 
CHARACTERISTIC
PS PS ‐ Rh PS PS ‐ Rh
A: SEA LAUNCHED (Count = 12)
AVERAGE: 0.0% 1.2% 1.6% 6.5%
STDEV: 0.00                  0.03                  0.02                  0.10                 
B: SUB LAUNCHED (Count = 4)
AVERAGE: 0.0% 0.4% 1.4% 11.4%
STDEV: 0.00                  0.01                  0.03                  0.14                 
LAND LAUNCHED (Count = 5)
AVERAGE: 0.0% 0.5% 0.3% 8.9%
STDEV: 0.00                  0.01                  0.00                  0.15                 
AIR LAUNCHED (Count =7)
AVERAGE: 0.0% 2.0% 0.9% 7.1%
STDEV: 0.00                  0.03                  0.02                  0.13                 
SPEED < M1.0 (Count = 15)
AVERAGE: 0.0% 0.2% 0.1% 2.3%
STDEV: 0.00                  0.00                  0.00                  0.00                 
SPEED >=M1.0 (Count = 4)
AVERAGE: 0.1% 3.0% 4.2% 13.3%
STDEV: 0.00                  0.05                  0.02                  0.15                 
DIAMETER < 40 cm (Count = 10)
AVERAGE: 0.0% 0.2% 0.1% 2.4%
STDEV: 0.00                  0.00                  0.00                  0.02                 
40 cm < DIAMETER 100 cm (Count = 8)
AVERAGE: 0.0% 1.5% 1.4% 6.5%
STDEV: 0.00                  0.03                  0.02                  0.12                 
DIAMETER > 100 cm (Count = 1)
AVERAGE: 0.2% 1.0% 5.4% 12.6%
STDEV:
RADAR HORIZON < 30 km (Count = 15)
AVERAGE: 0.0% 0.9% 0.8% 5.0%
STDEV: 0.00                  0.02                  0.02                  0.09                 
RADAR HORIZON > 30 km (Count = 4)
AVERAGE: 0.1% 0.3% 1.4% 3.3%
STDEV: 0.00                  0.01                  0.03                  0.06                 
ASCM SURVIVABILITY with Soft‐Kill
 
Table 16.   Summary of time-line survivability comparisons. 
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2. Monte Carlo Analysis 
The Monte Carlo analysis provides a statistical response to the question of how 
successful would any given ASCM be against a capable target ship.  From that data and 
given assumptions, the ASCM has approximately a ten percent survivability rate with no 
soft kill measures used which increases to 27–35 percent when soft kill measures are 
used.  Unfortunately for the ASCM, if the ship counters with soft kill measures, the 
success rates return to the ten percent range, using similarly capable soft kill measures. 
There is little correlation noted in the data with respect to the operational scenario.  
More correlation is noticed with the attack altitude and radar horizon which defines the 
range the first shot can be taken.  At the radar horizon, all targets presented an RCS to the 
target ship that easily allowed detection followed by a high number of shots.  This is due 
to the assumed highly capable acquisition radar on the target ship.  If the target ship were 
assumed to be less capable, the ASCM could have a corresponding higher probability of 
success. 
Table 17 summarizes the comparisons made using the Monte Carlo analysis.  
Comparisons were made for the number of shots possible against the ASCM, operational 
scenario, speed, size (RCS), and radar horizon.  In this data, none of the groups showed 
any significant variations from the overall averages.  The one outlier is the M3.0 Sunburn 
3M-80E that only receives one missile shot and the CIWS used against it.  A closer look 
at the data showed that Sunburn 3M-80 is the only ASCM with n (N in the model) equal 
to one.  Table 18 shows the Monte Carlo results for n=1 and n=5.  When n = 5, the values 
are closely aligned with the other ASCMs and Sunburn is no longer an outlier.  The value 
n = 1 in the binomial distribution did not let the model fluctuate enough to get realistic 
values.  Therefore, future analysis will need to use the higher value of n.  Note that this 
one ASCM result skewed the results for three cases, the N<4, speed >M1.0, and size 
greater than 100 cm categories.  
Table 19 shows a comparison of the straight multiplication from the time line 
analysis from the single shot that was taken after the radar horizon and the mean results 
from the Monte Carlo results.  The green shading and green font in the Monte Carlo 
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results depicts that the numbers matched within ten percent for the no soft kill case and 
within twelve percent of the case with soft kill measures added.  Again the data matches 






































































AVERAGE: 4.32  0.00% 74.56% 9.79% 0.1548  27.93% 79.00% 35.13% 0.1066  0.30% 73.66% 11.62% 0.1441 
STDEV: 1.60  0.00% 14.73% 0.08% 0.0454  1.43% 13.54% 2.33% 0.0334  0.00% 15.32% 1.58% 0.0310 
N<4 (Count = 4)
AVERAGE: 1.75  0.00% 100.00% 9.81% 0.2305  27.33% 70.36% 32.89% 0.1171  0.30% 99.69% 9.91% 0.1990 
STDEV: 0.50  0.00% 0.00% 0.09% 0.0447  0.00% 28.69% 3.71% 0.0781  0.00% 0.25% 2.77% 0.0065 
N=4 (Count = 5)
AVERAGE: 4.00  0.00% 72.50% 9.76% 0.1474  29.62% 85.51% 37.12% 0.1142  0.30% 73.43% 12.10% 0.1426 
STDEV: ‐    0.00% 5.59% 0.05% 0.0025  2.10% 5.17% 2.00% 0.0033  0.00% 6.69% 0.68% 0.0024 
N=5 (Count = 6)
AVERAGE: 5.00  0.00% 65.83% 9.79% 0.1338  27.33% 80.88% 35.01% 0.1030  0.30% 66.02% 12.32% 0.1281 
STDEV: ‐    0.00% 7.65% 0.07% 0.0063  0.00% 4.56% 0.05% 0.0008  0.00% 3.00% 0.72% 0.0015 
N>5 (Count = 4)
AVERAGE: 6.25  0.00% 64.80% 9.83% 0.1196  27.33% 76.68% 35.06% 0.0919  0.30% 59.36% 11.69% 0.1150 
STDEV: 0.50  0.00% 3.74% 0.11% 0.0056  0.00% 4.69% 0.09% 0.0029  0.00% 6.43% 0.69% 0.0060 
A: Sea Launched (Count = 12)
AVERAGE: 3.83  0.00% 78.49% 9.79% 0.1667  27.96% 78.51% 34.90% 0.1087  0.30% 77.48% 11.39% 0.1536 
STDEV: 1.70  0.00% 16.79% 0.06% 0.0532  1.49% 16.97% 2.78% 0.0419  0.00% 17.57% 1.90% 0.0348 
B: Submarine Launched (Count = 4)
AVERAGE: 3.25  0.00% 83.75% 9.76% 0.1956  27.33% 69.72% 32.99% 0.0905  0.30% 82.44% 10.65% 0.1623 
STDEV: 2.06  0.00% 19.74% 0.04% 0.0755  0.00% 28.35% 3.78% 0.0654  0.00% 19.92% 3.34% 0.0401 
C: Land Launched (Count = 5)
AVERAGE: 4.60  0.00% 69.14% 9.84% 0.1452  28.09% 82.66% 35.71% 0.1125  0.30% 70.70% 11.72% 0.1413 
STDEV: 2.06  0.00% 19.74% 0.04% 0.0755  0.00% 28.35% 3.78% 0.0654  0.00% 19.92% 3.34% 0.0401 
D: Air Launched (Count =7)
AVERAGE: 3.86  0.00% 77.02% 9.76% 0.1588  28.42% 82.56% 35.93% 0.1216  0.30% 78.49% 11.82% 0.1532 
STDEV: 1.46  0.00% 16.69% 0.05% 0.0351  1.87% 5.87% 1.81% 0.0248  0.00% 15.04% 0.69% 0.0350 
Speed< M 1.0 (Count = 15)
AVERAGE: 5.00  0.00% 67.78% 9.79% 0.1346  28.09% 81.30% 35.73% 0.1038  0.30% 66.72% 12.08% 0.1294 
STDEV: 0.93  0.00% 6.71% 0.08% 0.0121  1.58% 5.68% 1.48% 0.0092  0.00% 7.53% 0.70% 0.0115 
Speed>= M 1.0 (Count = 4)
AVERAGE: 1.75  0.00% 100.00% 9.81% 0.2305  27.33% 70.36% 32.89% 0.1171  0.30% 99.69% 9.91% 0.1990 
STDEV: 0.50  0.00% 0.00% 0.09% 0.0447  0.00% 28.69% 3.71% 0.0781  0.00% 0.25% 2.77% 0.0065 
Diameter <  40cm (Count = 10)
AVERAGE: 4.90  0.00% 69.33% 9.76% 0.1362  27.71% 80.62% 35.35% 0.1048  0.30% 67.69% 12.09% 0.1306 
STDEV: 0.74  0.00% 6.58% 0.06% 0.0112  1.21% 4.69% 1.13% 0.0084  0.00% 5.47% 0.75% 0.0093 
40 cm < Diameter   < 10 (Count = 8)
AVERAGE: 4.00  0.00% 77.92% 9.83% 0.1601  28.28% 83.42% 35.83% 0.1221  0.30% 77.82% 11.77% 0.1553 
STDEV: 1.93  0.00% 18.93% 0.09% 0.0413  1.77% 5.95% 1.72% 0.0294  0.00% 19.89% 0.63% 0.0407 
Diameter > 100 cm (Count = 1)
AVERAGE: 1.00  0.00% 100.00% 9.80% 0.2975  27.33% 27.33% 27.32% ‐         0.30% 99.96% 5.76% 0.1895 
STDEV: ‐    ‐       ‐          ‐       ‐         ‐       ‐       ‐       ‐         ‐       ‐       ‐       ‐        
RH < 30 km (Count = 15)
AVERAGE: 4.20  0.00% 75.12% 9.77% 0.1518  28.09% 83.04% 35.65% 0.1161  0.30% 74.67% 11.96% 0.1462 
STDEV: 1.32  0.00% 14.26% 0.06% 0.0307  1.58% 4.80% 1.52% 0.0219  0.00% 14.13% 0.72% 0.0303 
RH >30 km (Count = 4)
AVERAGE: 4.75  0.00% 72.46% 9.88% 0.1660  27.33% 63.82% 33.17% 0.0708  0.30% 69.85% 10.34% 0.1361 
STDEV: 2.63  0.00% 18.62% 0.09% 0.0881  0.00% 24.56% 3.90% 0.0476  0.00% 21.26% 3.12% 0.0370 
CHARACTERISTIC ASCM ONLY ASCM + ASCM SK ASCM + ASCM SK + SHIP SK
 









































































Sunburn (3M‐80E) SSN‐22 1             0.000% 100.000% 9.900% 0.29881       27.325% 27.325% 27.325% ‐                0.300% 99.987% 8.350% 0.20777      
Sunburn (3M‐80E) SSN‐22 5             0.000% 68.000% 9.752% 0.13120       27.325% 79.175% 34.987% 0.10230       0.300% 66.711% 12.868% 0.12669        
























































Exocet MM38 9.78% 35.00% 9.77% 38.57%
Exocet SM39 9.77% 34.99% 9.84% 38.56%
Exocet MM40 9.77% 34.99% 9.84% 38.65%
Exocet AM39 9.77% 34.99% 9.78% 38.61%
Harpoon RGM‐84 9.76% 34.99% 9.77% 38.69%
Harpoon UGM‐84 9.76% 34.99% 9.73% 38.64%
Harpoon AGM84  14.04% 38.43% 9.82% 38.61%
Silkworm CSS‐C‐2 19.46% 42.80% 9.69% 38.49%
Sizzler (91RE2) SS‐N‐27 9.76% 34.99% 9.77% 38.51%
Sizzler (3M‐14E) SS‐N‐27 9.77% 34.99% 9.79% 38.63%
Saccade C‐802  CSSC‐8/CSS‐N‐8 9.77% 34.99% 9.75% 38.61%
Saccade C‐802  CAS‐8 9.77% 34.99% 9.74% 38.61%
Sardine CSS‐C‐4 9.88% 35.09% 9.80% 38.56%
Styx SS‐N‐2D 9.81% 35.02% 9.84% 38.65%
Sunburn (3M‐80E) SS‐N‐22 9.75% 34.98% 19.44% 45.97%
Sunburn (Kh‐41) SS‐N‐22 9.76% 34.98% 9.93% 38.73%
Switchblade SS‐N‐25 9.76% 37.94% 9.80% 38.56%
BrahMos PJ‐10 9.77% 34.99% 14.03% 41.88%
RBS‐15 Mk 2 RBS‐15 9.77% 34.99% 9.73% 38.60%  
Table 19.   Comparison between Monte Carlo and straight multiply results. 
45 
IV. APPLICATION OF STUDY AND CONCLUSION 
A. APPLICATION 
Decision tree and time line analysis are straightforward tools that can be 
implemented on standard desktop computers.  These tools were used in this study to 
investigate the effects of ASCM performance while attempting to target and destroy a 
capable target ship equipped with modern sensors and defensive weapons systems.  The 
tools used here were able to quickly provide insight into the problems the ASCM faces 
which in turn reveals features that a target ship can capitalize on.  For example, high 
speed was shown to directly reduce the opportunity of a target ship to defend against the 
ASCM since high speed translates to short visibility windows and less time to employ 
defensive measures.  Even given the same probability of kill statistics, the high speed 
missile provides a higher threat to the target ship, because, at a minimum, it has to be 
prioritized at the highest level because any delay in deciding to defend against the ASCM 
leaves even less time to counter it.  When employed with soft kill measures, the higher 
speed ASCMs showed the highest potential to get through the target ship defenses. 
Ball (2003) suggests the following characteristics will affect the kill chain in the 
following ways: 
Susceptibility Factors: 
1. Threat Avoidance 
• Hide Launch – launch outside the target ship’s detection envelope 
2. Detection Avoidance 
• Keep ASCM profile under radar horizon as long as possible 
• Low RCS – delays detection 
3. Engagement Avoidance 
• Remain under radar horizon as long as possible – target detection delay 
reduces time to react 
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• Speed – faster time through envelope reduces time to react 
• Maneuver – guidance commands require constant vigilance to maintain 
attack 
• Electronic Jamming – obscuration of target reduces time to react and 
tracking confidence 
• Decoy – seduces proliferators, but not realistic on an ASCM 
• Low RCS – reduces threat systems capability to counter threat 
4. Threat or Hit Avoidance 
• Speed/Maneuver 
• Low RCS 
These features are all considered in the simulations used here.  Threat avoidance 
is key to both sides of an ASCM-SAM engagement.  Without knowledge that a threat is 
imminent, no kill chain defenses are activated.  The decision tree assumed that ship 
readiness was always 100 percent, otherwise the rest of the problem does not matter – the 
battle is lost from the beginning. 
Detection avoidance also occurs on both sides.  This study only looked at the 
ASCM’s detection avoidance or reduction techniques, but today’s ship planners are 
already taking this into account ship signature reduction.  The ASCM needs to detect the 
ship before the target ship can target it.  Because of the advanced radar technology 
available in today’s ship radar systems, the target ship has a high probability if detecting 
the incoming ASCM, despite its relatively small size.  There was not much difference 
seen in the detection probabilities for the sampled ASCMs, but future ASCMs could 
benefit by RCS reduction of at least one order of magnitude.  The radar horizon also 
played a key role in this study as the ASCMs with very low attack altitudes showed very 
short radar horizon ranges, leading to fewer attempts by the target ship to defeat the 
incoming ASCM.  Hence ASCM’s ability to fly closer to the ground greatly improved 
performance.  This feature could be offset however, by the target ship having over-the-
horizon targeting assets to target and engage the ASCM at greater ranges. 
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Engagement avoidance has similar characteristics as detection avoidance.  The 
ASCM needs to be trackable by the target ship for it to engage its weapon system.  If the 
ASCM can remain under radar horizon for as long as possible, the target ship will be 
delayed in targeting and engaging it.  Similarly, high ASCM speed can greatly reduce the 
time that the ASCM is in the target ship’s engagement window, thereby reducing time for 
the target ship to obtain a target solution and engage the ASCM.  Soft kill measures from 
the ASCM-side forces can assist in obscuring the ASCM and confusing the target ship, 
thereby delaying the target ship’s ability to defend against the ASCM.  One thing not 
looked at in this study that can affect the engagement phase is ASCM maneuvers.  It is 
more difficult for the target ship to track a maneuvering target because the target solution 
is constantly changing every time the target (ASCM) maneuvers. 
The kill given a hit (kill/hit) phase may also be affected by avoidance techniques.  
If the intercept can be broken at the last minute and a hit avoided, the ASCM has a 
chance to complete its mission.  However, similar techniques used in other phases to 
avoid detection, employ speed, maneuver, employ soft kill features are not expected to be 
to get the results achieved in those phases.  Physical improvements such as hardening the 
ASCM may be shown to be more effective. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
1. Key Points and Recommendations 
The research question was “What can ship designer’s do to improve survivability 
against anti-ship cruise missiles?  What ASCM features can be exploited to enhance the 
ability to attack them before they reach their target?  How can common software tools 
such as decision tree models and spreadsheets be used to help analyze this scenario?” 
This paper shows that common software programs that perform spreadsheet and 
decision tree analysis can be used to provide insight to the ship designer.  The study 
showed that an ASCM designer is likely to increase speed, fly low, and reduce RCS to 
improve its chances.  Additionally, they are highly likely to employ soft kill measures 
such as jamming as ways to improve results with current systems.   
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The mirror images of these findings are that the defending ship’s survivability can 
be enhanced by exploiting selected features of potential missiles, namely, slower speeds, 
larger radar cross sections, higher attack profiles, and jamming countermeasures. 
Today’s radar systems are highly capable and may not need to be improved to 
produce detection results desired.  They may however, need to employ features that 
counter soft kill measures and need high reliability to be ready at all times. 
2. Areas for Further Research 
The decision tree analysis can easily be enhanced to include more features that 
affect the kill chain.  For example, the soft kill analysis could be expanded by more 
detailed modeling of actual real life detection and tracking effects like ground clutter, 
multiple targets, and radio wave ducting.  Future studies should look at multiplicative 
effects such as the addition of more target ships and the addition of multiple ASCMs.  
Additionally, the effect of saturating a single target ship with ASCMs from multiple 
angles should be researched.  Including maneuvering ASCMs into the model should also 
be considered. 
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APPENDIX. DATA ANALYSIS RESULTS 
ASCM SILKWORM 
Characteristic1  MM 38 (ship) MM 40 (ship) SM 39 (Sub) AM 39  (Air) RBS-15F RBS-15K RBS-15L CSS-C-2/HY-1/SY-1
Origin France France France France Sweden Sweden Sweden China
670 - 735 kg 630 kg 800 kg 80 kg 2,300 kg
1500 - 1620 lb 1771 lbs 1771 lbs 1771 lbs 5060 lbs
 5.21 m 5.8 m 4.69 m 4.69 m 4.35 m 4.35 m 4.35 m 6.6m
17.1 ft 19.0 ft 15.4 ft 15.4 ft
35 cm 35 cm 35 cm 35 cm 50 cm 50 cm 50 cm 76 cm
13.8 in 13.8 in 13.8 in 13.8 in 19.7 in 19.7 in 19.7 in
Wingspan 2.4m
165 kg HE 165 kg HE 165 kg HE 165 kg HE 200 kg HE SAP 200 kg HE SAP 200 kg HE SAP 454 kg he
363.8 lbs 363.8 lbs 363.8 lbs 363.8 lbs 441 lb HE 441 lb HE 441 lb HE
Engine Solid Solid Solid Solid Turbojet Turbojet Turbojet
Min Range 10 km 10 km 10 km
Operational Range 40 km 70 km 50 km 70 km 150 km 150 km 150 km 40 km
21.6 nm 37.8 nm 30.0 nm 37.8 nm 108 nmi 108 nmi 108 nmi
Attack Altitude 3m5 3m5 3m5 3m5 3m 3m 3m 30 m
Cruise Altitude 100-300m
1134 km/h 1134 km/h 1134 km/h 1134 km/h
612 kts 612 kts 612 kts 612 kts
M .9 M .9 M .9 M .9 M .8 M .8 M .8 M.9
Navigation Inertial Inertial Inertial Inertial Inertial, GPS Inertial, GPS Inertial, GPS
Terminal guidance Active Radar Active Radar Active Radar Active Radar Active Radar (J-Band) Active Radar (J-Band) Active Radar (J-Band)
Surface Ship [A] Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sub-Surface [B] Yes
Land [C] Yes Yes Yes
Air [D] Yes Yes
1 Information extracted from Jane's Strategic Weapon System's at www.janes.com unless otherwise noted
2 Information extracted from Global Security.org
3 Information extracted from FAS.org
4Information extracted from Mahnken (2005)









Table 20.   Typical Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM) profiles (1/3). 
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ASCM Sardine
Characteristic1 3M-54E 3M-54E1 3M-14E 91RE1 91RE2 CSSC-8/SS-N-8 CAS-8 CSS-N-4 SS-N-2c SS-N-2d
Origin China China China China China China China Rusia Russia Russia
2300 kg 1780 kg 1780 kg 2050 kg 1300 kg 715 kg [A,C] 555 kg [D] 815 kg 2500 kg 2600 kg
5060 lbs 3916 lbs 3916 lbs 4510 lbs 2860 lbs 5500 lbs 5720 lbs
8.22 m 6.2 m 6.2 m 8 m 6.5 m 6.39 m [A,C] 5.3 m [D] 5.81 m 6.5 m 6.5 m
53.3 cm 53.3 cm 53.3 cm 53.3 cm 53.3 cm 36 cm 36 cm 36 cm 76cm 76cm
21 in 21 in 21 in 21 in 21 in 14.2 in 14.2 in 14.2 in
Wingspan 1.18 m
165 kg HE 165 kg HE
200 kg HE 400 kg HE 400 kg HE 76 kg HE 76 kg HE 364 lb HE 364 lb HE 165 kg HE
Engine turbo jet turbo jet Solid
Min Range 15 km 15 km 8 km 8 km 8 km
4.5 nm 3nm 3nm
Operational Range 220 km 300 km 300 km 50 km 40 km 120 km 130 km 42 km 80 km 80 km
119 km 162 nm 162 nm 27 nm 21.6 km 64.8 70.2 23 nm 43.2 nm 43.2 nm
Attack Altitude 5 -10 m 5 -10 m 5 -10 m 5 -10 m 5 -10 m 5-7 m 5-7 m 20-30 m 25-50 m 25-50 m
Cruise Altitude 20-30 m 20-30 m 50 m
M .8 M .8 M .9 M 2.5 M 2.0 M .85 M .85 M .9 M .9 M .9
Navigation Inertial/actice Radar Inertial/actice Radar
Terminal guidance 75%
Surface Ship [A] Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sub-Surface [B] Yes Yes Yes
Land [C] Yes Yes
Air [D] Yes Yes
1 Information extracted from Jane's Strategic Weapon System's at www.janes.com
2 Information extracted from Global Security.org
3 Information extracted from FAS.org
4Information extracted from Mahnken (2005)






3M-54 Klub / SS-N-27 / SIZZLER3 StyxSaccade C-802
 
Table 21.   Typical ASCM profiles (2/3). 
 53
ASCM SS-N-25 Switchblade BrahMos Harpoon
Characteristic1 3M-80 3M-82 3M-882M Kh-41 Kh-35/SS-N-25/AS-20 PJ-10 RGM-84
Origin Russia Russia Russia Russia Russia  India U.S.
3970 kg 4150 kg 4150 kg 3950kg 520-610 kg 3900 kg 519-628 kg
1150 - 1340 lb 8580 lbs 1144-1385 lb
9.745 m 9.745 m 9.745 m 9.745 m 3.85 - 5.40  m 9.00 m 4.7m
12.7 - 14.4 ft 15.4 ft
130 130 130 76 42 cm 67 cm 34.3 cm
1.4 ft 26.4 in 1.1 ft
Wingspan 1.9 m 2.1 m 2.1 m .91 m
325 kg HE 325 kg HE 325 kg HE 300kg HE 145 kg HE 221 kg HE
320 lb HE 200 kg HE 487 lb HE
Engine turbofan Ramjet turbojet
Min Range 10 km 10 km 10 km 10 km
Operational Range 93 km 120 km 120 km 250 km 130 km 290 km 220 km
45 nm 65 nm 65 nm 70 nmi 162 nm
Attack Altitude 20 m 7m 7m 7m 2 m 5 m 3m5
Cruise Altitude 20 m 7-20m 7-20m 7-20m 5 m
Mach .8 864 km/h
537 mph
M2.6 M3 M3 M 2.1 M 2.0 Mach .81
Navigation inertial, radalt Inertial, gps
Terminal guidance active radar Active Radar
Surface Ship [A] Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes (RGM-84)
Sub-Surface [B] Yes Yes (UGM-84)
Land [C] Yes (SSC-6) Yes
Air [D] Yes (potential) Yes (fixed and rotary) Yes Yes (AGM-84)
1 Information extracted from Jane's Strategic Weapon System's at www.janes.com unless otherwise noted
2 Information extracted from Global Security.org
3 Information extracted from FAS.org
4Information extracted from Mahnken (2005)





























































































1 Exocet MM38 X 5.21          35.0          3 17 40       0.9        1,101        24.1        52           131          167.0            (10.2)    12.2         0.3539507      40.0 24.8           37.1          0.9963846     
2 Exocet MM40 X 5.80          35.0          3 17 70       0.9        1,101        24.1        150         229          167.0            (10.2)    12.2         0.3539507      70.0 15.1           27.3          0.9666548     
5 Harpoon RGM‐84 X 3.85          34.3          3 17 140     0.8        991            24.1        421         509          167.0            (10.3)    12.1         0.3399647      140.0 3.1             15.1          0.5774331     
9 Sizzler (91RE2) SS‐N‐27 X 6.50        53.3        5 17 40     2.5      3,058      26.2      16         47             167.0           (6.5)    15.9       0.6295912    40.0 24.8         40.7        0.9984393   
10 Sizzler (3M‐14E) SS‐N‐27 X 8.22        53.3        5 17 300   0.9      1,101      26.2      895       981          167.0           (6.5)    15.9       0.6295912    300.0 (10.2)       5.7           0.0203038   
11 C‐802 [Ship] C‐802 X 5.30          36.0          3 17 120     0.9        1,040        24.1        332         416          167.0            (9.9)      12.5         0.3735360      120.0 5.7             18.2          0.7609070     
14 Styx SS‐N‐2 X 6.50        76.0        30 17 100   0.9      1,101      39.6      198       327          167.0           (3.4)    19.0       0.7941279    100.0 8.9           27.9        0.9704813   
16 Sunburn  (Kh‐41) [A,D] SS‐N‐22 X X 9.75          76.0          3 17 100     3.0        3,669        24.1        74           98             167.0            (3.4)      19.0         0.7941279      100.0 8.9             27.9          0.9704813     
17 Switchblade SS‐N‐25 X X X 3.85          42.0          2 17 130     0.8        978            22.8        394         478          167.0            (8.6)      13.8         0.4800372      130.0 4.4             18.2          0.7584656     
19 RBS‐15 RBS‐15 X X X 4.35          50.0          9 17 150     0.9        1,101        29.4        395         491          167.0            (7.1)      15.3         0.5921592      150.0 1.9             17.2          0.7085976     
15 Sunburn (3M‐80E) [A] SS‐N‐22 X X 9.75          130.0       20 17 120     3.0        3,669        35.4        83           118          167.0            1.2        23.6         0.9236361      120.0 5.7             29.4          0.9789790     
18 BrahMos PJ‐10 X X X X 9.00        67.0        5 17 290   2.0      2,446      26.2      388       427          167.0           (4.5)    17.9       0.7441311    290.0 (9.6)         8.3           0.0926814   
6 Harpoon UGM‐84 X 3.85          34.3          3 17 140     0.8        991            24.1        421         509          167.0            (10.3)    12.1         0.3399647      140.0 3.1             15.1          0.5774331     
3 Exocet SM39 X 4.69          35.0          3 17 50       0.9        1,101        24.1        85           164          167.0            (10.2)    12.2         0.3539507      50.0 20.9           33.2          0.9911989     
8 Silkworm CSS‐C‐2 X 6.60        76.0        100 17 100   0.8      978          58.2      154       368          167.0           (3.4)    19.0       0.7941279    100.0 8.9           27.9        0.9704813   
13 Sardine CSS‐C‐4 X 5.81        36.0        30 17 42     0.9      1,101      39.6      8            137          167.0           (9.9)    12.5       0.3735360    42.0 24.0         36.5        0.9958475   
4 Exocet AM39 X 4.69          35.0          3 17 70       0.9        1,101        24.1        150         229          167.0            (10.2)    12.2         0.3539507      70.0 15.1           27.3          0.9666548     
7 Harpoon AGM84 X 3.85          34.3          3 17 315   0.8      991          24.1      1,057   1,145       167.0           (10.3)  12.1       0.3399647    315.0 (11.0)       1.0           0.0002988   






























































































1 Exocet MM38 X 5.21          35.0          3 17 40       0.9        1,101        24.1        52           131          167.0            (10.2)    12.2         0.3539507      24.1 33.6           45.8          0.9995191     
2 Exocet MM40 X 5.80          35.0          3 17 70       0.9        1,101        24.1        150         229          167.0            (10.2)    12.2         0.3539507      24.1 33.6           45.8          0.9995191     
5 Harpoon RGM‐84 X 3.85          34.3          3 17 140     0.8        991            24.1        421         509          167.0            (10.3)    12.1         0.3399647      24.1 33.6           45.7          0.9994992     
9 Sizzler (91RE2) SS‐N‐27 X 6.50        53.3        5 17 40     2.5      3,058      26.2      16         47             167.0           (6.5)    15.9       0.6295912    26.2 32.2         48.0        0.9997114   
10 Sizzler (3M‐14E) SS‐N‐27 X 8.22        53.3        5 17 300   0.9      1,101      26.2      895       981          167.0           (6.5)    15.9       0.6295912    26.2 32.2         48.0        0.9997114   
11 C‐802 [Ship] C‐802 X 5.30          36.0          3 17 120     0.9        1,040        24.1        332         416          167.0            (9.9)      12.5         0.3735360      24.1 33.6           46.1          0.9995454     
14 Styx SS‐N‐2 X 6.50        76.0        30 17 100   0.9      1,101      39.6      198       327          167.0           (3.4)    19.0       0.7941279    39.6 25.0         44.0        0.9992629   
16 Sunburn  (Kh‐41) [A,D] SS‐N‐22 X X 9.75          76.0          3 17 100     3.0        3,669        24.1        74           98             167.0            (3.4)      19.0         0.7941279      24.1 33.6           52.6          0.9998980     
17 Switchblade SS‐N‐25 X X X 3.85          42.0          2 17 130     0.8        978            22.8        394         478          167.0            (8.6)      13.8         0.4800372      22.8 34.6           48.4          0.9997328     
19 RBS‐15 RBS‐15 X X X 4.35          50.0          9 17 150     0.9        1,101        29.4        395         491          167.0            (7.1)      15.3         0.5921592      29.4 30.2           45.5          0.9994838     
15 Sunburn (3M‐80E) [A] SS‐N‐22 X X 9.75          130.0       20 17 120     3.0        3,669        35.4        83           118          167.0            1.2        23.6         0.9236361      35.4 26.9           50.6          0.9998381     
18 BrahMos PJ‐10 X X X X 9.00        67.0        5 17 290   2.0      2,446      26.2      388       427          167.0           (4.5)    17.9       0.7441311    26.2 32.2         50.0        0.9998174   
6 Harpoon UGM‐84 X 3.85          34.3          3 17 140     0.8        991            24.1        421         509          167.0            (10.3)    12.1         0.3399647      24.1 33.6           45.7          0.9994992     
3 Exocet SM39 X 4.69          35.0          3 17 50       0.9        1,101        24.1        85           164          167.0            (10.2)    12.2         0.3539507      24.1 33.6           45.8          0.9995191     
8 Silkworm CSS‐C‐2 X 6.60        76.0        100 17 100   0.8      978          58.2      154       368          167.0           (3.4)    19.0       0.7941279    58.2 18.3         37.3        0.9965529   
13 Sardine CSS‐C‐4 X 5.81        36.0        30 17 42     0.9      1,101      39.6      8            137          167.0           (9.9)    12.5       0.3735360    39.6 25.0         37.5        0.9967195   
4 Exocet AM39 X 4.69          35.0          3 17 70       0.9        1,101        24.1        150         229          167.0            (10.2)    12.2         0.3539507      24.1 33.6           45.8          0.9995191     
7 Harpoon AGM84 X 3.85          34.3          3 17 315   0.8      991          24.1      1,057   1,145       167.0           (10.3)  12.1       0.3399647    24.1 33.6         45.7        0.9994992   





























Table 27.   ASCM time-line diagrams (3/9). 
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Table 32.   ASCM time-line diagrams (8/9). 
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Table 33.   ASCM time-line diagrams (9/9). 
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@RISK Output Report for EXOCET MM-38:  
Performed By: Roy Smith












Minimum 0.0% 5% 0.0%
Maximum 76.0% 10% 0.0%
Mean 9.7% 15% 0.0%
Std Dev 13.2% 20% 0.0%
Variance 0.017382342 25% 0.0%
Skewness 1.15257757 30% 0.0%
Kurtosis 3.862116898 35% 0.0%
Median 0.0% 40% 0.0%
Mode 0.0% 45% 0.0%
Left X 0.0% 50% 0.0%
Left P 5% 55% 0.0%
Right X 36.0% 60% 0.0%
Right P 95% 65% 20.0%
Diff X 36.0% 70% 20.0%
Diff P 90% 75% 20.0%
#Errors 0 80% 20.0%
Filter Min Off 85% 20.0%
Filter Max Off 90% 20.0%
#Filtered 0 95% 36.0%
Rank Name Regr Corr
1 ENGAGE‐0 ‐0.695 ‐0.694
2 KILL/HIT‐0 ‐0.692 ‐0.692
3 DETECTION‐0 ‐0.047 ‐0.032
4 DETECTION‐SK 0.000 0
5 DETECTION 0.000 0
6 ENGAGE‐SK 0.000 0
7 ENGAGE 0.000 0
8 KILL/HIT‐SK 0.000 0









Table 34.   @Risk results for EXOCET MM-38. 
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@RISK Output Report for EXOCET MM-38 with Soft Kill: 
Performed By: Roy Smith












Minimum 0.3% 5% 0.3%
Maximum 61.6% 10% 0.4%
Mean 11.4% 15% 0.7%
Std Dev 12.7% 20% 1.1%
Variance 0.016144978 25% 1.3%
Skewness 1.121428652 30% 1.8%
Kurtosis 3.671958235 35% 2.2%
Median 3.6% 40% 2.6%
Mode 0.3% 45% 3.0%
Left X 0.3% 50% 3.6%
Left P 5% 55% 4.3%
Right X 38.7% 60% 18.2%
Right P 95% 65% 19.7%
Diff X 38.4% 70% 20.4%
Diff P 90% 75% 21.0%
#Errors 0 80% 21.5%
Filter Min Off 85% 22.2%
Filter Max Off 90% 23.3%
#Filtered 0 95% 38.7%
Rank Name Regr Corr
1 KILL/HIT ‐0.710 ‐0.602
2 ENGAGE ‐0.700 ‐0.580
3 DETECTION‐SK ‐0.071 ‐0.319
4 ENGAGE‐SK ‐0.057 ‐0.206
5 DETECTION ‐0.050 ‐0.070
6 KILL/HIT‐SK ‐0.028 ‐0.127
7 DETECTION‐0 0.000 0
8 ENGAGE‐0 0.000 0









Table 35.   @Risk results for EXOCET MM-38 with soft kill. 
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@RISK Output Report for EXOCET SM-39: 
Performed By: Roy Smith












Minimum 0.0% 5% 0.0%
Maximum 75.0% 10% 0.0%
Mean 9.8% 15% 0.0%
Std Dev 14.7% 20% 0.0%
Variance 0.021514792 25% 0.0%
Skewness 1.263423258 30% 0.0%
Kurtosis 3.841028084 35% 0.0%
Median 0.0% 40% 0.0%
Mode 0.0% 45% 0.0%
Left X 0.0% 50% 0.0%
Left P 5% 55% 0.0%
Right X 43.8% 60% 0.0%
Right P 95% 65% 0.0%
Diff X 43.8% 70% 25.0%
Diff P 90% 75% 25.0%
#Errors 0 80% 25.0%
Filter Min Off 85% 25.0%
Filter Max Off 90% 25.0%
#Filtered 0 95% 43.8%
Rank Name Regr Corr
1 KILL/HIT‐0 ‐0.709 ‐0.684
2 ENGAGE‐0 ‐0.703 ‐0.688
3 DETECTION‐0 ‐0.053 ‐0.040
4 DETECTION‐SK 0.000 0
5 DETECTION 0.000 0
6 ENGAGE‐SK 0.000 0
7 ENGAGE 0.000 0
8 KILL/HIT‐SK 0.000 0









Table 36.   @Risk results for EXOCET SM-39. 
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@RISK Output Report for EXOCET SM-39 with Soft Kill: 
Performed By: Roy Smith












Minimum 0.3% 5% 0.3%
Maximum 65.1% 10% 0.5%
Mean 12.8% 15% 1.1%
Std Dev 12.8% 20% 1.7%
Variance 0.016357294 25% 2.2%
Skewness 1.077311856 30% 3.0%
Kurtosis 3.625860301 35% 3.6%
Median 6.6% 40% 4.6%
Mode 0.3% 45% 5.5%
Left X 0.3% 50% 6.6%
Left P 5% 55% 8.4%
Right X 38.5% 60% 13.5%
Right P 95% 65% 18.9%
Diff X 38.2% 70% 20.5%
Diff P 90% 75% 21.8%
#Errors 0 80% 23.2%
Filter Min Off 85% 25.0%
Filter Max Off 90% 28.7%
#Filtered 0 95% 38.5%
Rank Name Regr Corr
1 KILL/HIT ‐0.678 ‐0.617
2 ENGAGE ‐0.663 ‐0.591
3 DETECTION‐SK ‐0.150 ‐0.302
4 ENGAGE‐SK ‐0.139 ‐0.273
5 KILL/HIT‐SK ‐0.060 ‐0.096
6 DETECTION ‐0.040 ‐0.026
7 DETECTION‐0 0.000 0
8 ENGAGE‐0 0.000 0









Table 37.   @Risk results for EXOCET SM-39 with soft kill. 
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@RISK Output Report for EXOCET AM-39/MM-40: 
Performed By: Roy Smith












Minimum 0.0% 5% 0.0%
Maximum 75.0% 10% 0.0%
Mean 9.7% 15% 0.0%
Std Dev 15.0% 20% 0.0%
Variance 0.022393816 25% 0.0%
Skewness 1.302843875 30% 0.0%
Kurtosis 3.833970597 35% 0.0%
Median 0.0% 40% 0.0%
Mode 0.0% 45% 0.0%
Left X 0.0% 50% 0.0%
Left P 5% 55% 0.0%
Right X 43.8% 60% 0.0%
Right P 95% 65% 0.0%
Diff X 43.8% 70% 25.0%
Diff P 90% 75% 25.0%
#Errors 0 80% 25.0%
Filter Min Off 85% 25.0%
Filter Max Off 90% 25.0%
#Filtered 0 95% 43.8%
Rank Name Regr Corr
1 KILL/HIT‐0 ‐0.695 ‐0.710
2 ENGAGE‐0 ‐0.679 ‐0.702
3 DETECTION‐0 ‐0.042 ‐0.060
4 DETECTION‐SK 0.000 0
5 DETECTION 0.000 0
6 ENGAGE‐SK 0.000 0
7 ENGAGE 0.000 0
8 KILL/HIT‐SK 0.000 0









Table 38.   @Risk results for EXOCET AM-39/MM-40. 
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@RISK Output Report for EXOCET AM-39/MM-40 with Soft Kill: 
Performed By: Roy Smith












Minimum 0.3% 5% 0.3%
Maximum 73.4% 10% 0.5%
Mean 12.8% 15% 1.1%
Std Dev 14.2% 20% 1.6%
Variance 0.020216686 25% 2.1%
Skewness 1.227712574 30% 2.6%
Kurtosis 3.900030115 35% 3.2%
Median 5.6% 40% 3.8%
Mode 0.3% 45% 4.5%
Left X 0.3% 50% 5.6%
Left P 5% 55% 6.7%
Right X 42.2% 60% 8.4%
Right P 95% 65% 11.5%
Diff X 41.9% 70% 24.0%
Diff P 90% 75% 25.5%
#Errors 0 80% 26.7%
Filter Min Off 85% 28.2%
Filter Max Off 90% 29.7%
#Filtered 0 95% 42.2%
Rank Name Regr Corr
1 KILL/HIT ‐0.688 ‐0.584
2 ENGAGE ‐0.677 ‐0.558
3 DETECTION‐SK ‐0.137 ‐0.322
4 ENGAGE‐SK ‐0.115 ‐0.259
5 KILL/HIT‐SK ‐0.061 ‐0.148
6 DETECTION ‐0.053 ‐0.045
7 DETECTION‐0 0.000 0
8 ENGAGE‐0 0.000 0









Table 39.   @Risk results for EXOCET AM-39/MM-40 with soft kill. 
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@RISK Output Report for HARPOON RGM-84/UGM-84: 
Performed By: Roy Smith












Minimum 0.0% 5% 0.0%
Maximum 60.0% 10% 0.0%
Mean 9.8% 15% 0.0%
Std Dev 13.1% 20% 0.0%
Variance 0.017093676 25% 0.0%
Skewness 1.035242836 30% 0.0%
Kurtosis 3.153596525 35% 0.0%
Median 0.0% 40% 0.0%
Mode 0.0% 45% 0.0%
Left X 0.0% 50% 0.0%
Left P 5% 55% 0.0%
Right X 36.0% 60% 20.0%
Right P 95% 65% 20.0%
Diff X 36.0% 70% 20.0%
Diff P 90% 75% 20.0%
#Errors 0 80% 20.0%
Filter Min Off 85% 20.0%
Filter Max Off 90% 20.0%
#Filtered 0 95% 36.0%
Rank Name Regr Corr
1 ENGAGE‐0 ‐0.716 ‐0.685
2 KILL/HIT‐0 ‐0.715 ‐0.683
3 DETECTION‐0 0.000 0
4 DETECTION‐SK 0.000 0
5 DETECTION 0.000 0
6 ENGAGE‐SK 0.000 0
7 ENGAGE 0.000 0
8 KILL/HIT‐SK 0.000 0









Table 40.   @Risk results for HARPOON RGM-84/UGM-84. 
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@RISK Output Report for HARPOON RGM-84/UGM-84 with Soft  Kill: 
Performed By: Roy Smith












Minimum 0.3% 5% 0.3%
Maximum 65.3% 10% 0.5%
Mean 12.8% 15% 1.0%
Std Dev 12.8% 20% 1.6%
Variance 0.016419957 25% 2.1%
Skewness 1.043407544 30% 2.8%
Kurtosis 3.492029779 35% 3.7%
Median 6.7% 40% 4.5%
Mode 0.3% 45% 5.3%
Left X 0.3% 50% 6.7%
Left P 5% 55% 8.2%
Right X 39.3% 60% 15.4%
Right P 95% 65% 19.3%
Diff X 39.0% 70% 20.8%
Diff P 90% 75% 21.9%
#Errors 0 80% 23.4%
Filter Min Off 85% 25.1%
Filter Max Off 90% 28.4%
#Filtered 0 95% 39.3%
Rank Name Regr Corr
1 KILL/HIT ‐0.692 ‐0.601
2 ENGAGE ‐0.675 ‐0.592
3 DETECTION‐SK ‐0.156 ‐0.285
4 ENGAGE‐SK ‐0.131 ‐0.264
5 KILL/HIT‐SK ‐0.061 ‐0.139
6 DETECTION ‐0.033 ‐0.046
7 DETECTION‐0 0.000 0
8 ENGAGE‐0 0.000 0









Table 41.   @Risk results for HARPOON RGM-84/UGM-84 with soft kill. 
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@RISK Output Report for HARPOON AGM-84: 
Performed By: Roy Smith












Minimum 0.0% 5% 0.0%
Maximum 75.0% 10% 0.0%
Mean 9.7% 15% 0.0%
Std Dev 14.8% 20% 0.0%
Variance 0.021985857 25% 0.0%
Skewness 1.328233469 30% 0.0%
Kurtosis 4.168840493 35% 0.0%
Median 0.0% 40% 0.0%
Mode 0.0% 45% 0.0%
Left X 0.0% 50% 0.0%
Left P 5% 55% 0.0%
Right X 43.8% 60% 0.0%
Right P 95% 65% 0.0%
Diff X 43.8% 70% 25.0%
Diff P 90% 75% 25.0%
#Errors 0 80% 25.0%
Filter Min Off 85% 25.0%
Filter Max Off 90% 25.0%
#Filtered 0 95% 43.8%
Rank Name Regr Corr
1 KILL/HIT‐0 ‐0.701 ‐0.695
2 ENGAGE‐0 ‐0.697 ‐0.691
3 DETECTION‐0 0.000 0
4 DETECTION‐SK 0.000 0
5 DETECTION 0.000 0
6 ENGAGE‐SK 0.000 0
7 ENGAGE 0.000 0
8 KILL/HIT‐SK 0.000 0









Table 42.   @Risk results for HARPOON AGM-84. 
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@RISK Output Report for HARPOON AGM-84 with Soft Kill: 
Performed By: Roy Smith












Minimum 0.3% 5% 0.3%
Maximum 76.4% 10% 0.5%
Mean 11.6% 15% 1.0%
Std Dev 14.3% 20% 1.3%
Variance 0.020506462 25% 1.6%
Skewness 1.272970895 30% 1.9%
Kurtosis 3.813396575 35% 2.2%
Median 3.2% 40% 2.6%
Mode 0.3% 45% 2.9%
Left X 0.3% 50% 3.2%
Left P 5% 55% 3.7%
Right X 43.7% 60% 4.4%
Right P 95% 65% 5.6%
Diff X 43.4% 70% 23.9%
Diff P 90% 75% 25.0%
#Errors 0 80% 25.9%
Filter Min Off 85% 27.0%
Filter Max Off 90% 27.8%
#Filtered 0 95% 43.7%
Rank Name Regr Corr
1 KILL/HIT ‐0.696 ‐0.592
2 ENGAGE ‐0.694 ‐0.560
3 DETECTION‐SK ‐0.061 ‐0.303
4 KILL/HIT‐SK ‐0.056 ‐0.243
5 ENGAGE‐SK ‐0.050 ‐0.125
6 DETECTION ‐0.045 ‐0.051
7 DETECTION‐0 0.000 0
8 ENGAGE‐0 0.000 0















Minimum 0.0% 5% 0.0%
Maximum 59.2% 10% 0.0%
Mean 10.0% 15% 0.0%
Std Dev 11.1% 20% 0.0%
Variance 0.012390863 25% 0.0%
Skewness 0.92157812 30% 0.0%
Kurtosis 3.460939545 35% 0.0%
Median 14.3% 40% 0.0%
Mode 0.0% 45% 0.0%
Left X 0.0% 50% 14.3%
Left P 5% 55% 14.3%
Right X 28.6% 60% 14.3%
Right P 95% 65% 14.3%
Diff X 28.6% 70% 14.3%
Diff P 90% 75% 14.3%
#Errors 0 80% 14.3%
Filter Min Off 85% 26.5%
Filter Max Off 90% 26.5%
#Filtered 0 95% 28.6%
Rank Name Regr Corr
1 KILL/HIT‐0 ‐0.704 ‐0.667
2 ENGAGE‐0 ‐0.702 ‐0.668
3 DETECTION‐0 ‐0.153 ‐0.161
4 DETECTION‐SK 0.000 0
5 DETECTION 0.000 0
6 ENGAGE‐SK 0.000 0
7 ENGAGE 0.000 0
8 KILL/HIT‐SK 0.000 0







Table 44.   @Risk results for SILKWORM. 
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Minimum 0.3% 5% 0.3%
Maximum 52.4% 10% 0.5%
Mean 11.5% 15% 0.9%
Std Dev 10.6% 20% 1.3%
Variance 0.011305795 25% 1.8%
Skewness 0.800668741 30% 2.2%
Kurtosis 3.057469861 35% 2.7%
Median 13.5% 40% 3.3%
Mode 0.3% 45% 4.3%
Left X 0.3% 50% 13.5%
Left P 5% 55% 14.4%
Right X 30.2% 60% 15.0%
Right P 95% 65% 15.5%
Diff X 29.9% 70% 16.1%
Diff P 90% 75% 16.8%
#Errors 0 80% 17.7%
Filter Min Off 85% 24.7%
Filter Max Off 90% 28.3%
#Filtered 0 95% 30.2%
Rank Name Regr Corr
1 KILL/HIT ‐0.718 ‐0.611
2 ENGAGE ‐0.708 ‐0.599
3 DETECTION ‐0.154 ‐0.109
4 DETECTION‐SK ‐0.084 ‐0.311
5 ENGAGE‐SK ‐0.078 ‐0.165
6 KILL/HIT‐SK ‐0.039 ‐0.146
7 DETECTION‐0 0.000 0
8 ENGAGE‐0 0.000 0
9 KILL/HIT‐0 0.000 0
Regression and Rank Information for ASCM SURVIV
 
Table 45.   @Risk results for SILKWORM with soft kill. 
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@RISK Output Report for SIZZLER (91RE2): 
Performed By: Roy Smith












Minimum 0.0% 5% 0.0%
Maximum 100.0% 10% 0.0%
Mean 9.9% 15% 0.0%
Std Dev 20.8% 20% 0.0%
Variance 0.043367367 25% 0.0%
Skewness 1.784599415 30% 0.0%
Kurtosis 4.852270913 35% 0.0%
Median 0.0% 40% 0.0%
Mode 0.0% 45% 0.0%
Left X 0.0% 50% 0.0%
Left P 5% 55% 0.0%
Right X 50.0% 60% 0.0%
Right P 95% 65% 0.0%
Diff X 50.0% 70% 0.0%
Diff P 90% 75% 0.0%
#Errors 0 80% 0.0%
Filter Min Off 85% 50.0%
Filter Max Off 90% 50.0%
#Filtered 0 95% 50.0%
Rank Name Regr Corr
1 KILL/HIT‐0 ‐0.726 ‐0.685
2 ENGAGE‐0 ‐0.714 ‐0.684
3 DETECTION‐0 0.000 0
4 DETECTION‐SK 0.000 0
5 DETECTION 0.000 0
6 ENGAGE‐SK 0.000 0
7 ENGAGE 0.000 0
8 KILL/HIT‐SK 0.000 0









Table 46.   @Risk results for SIZZLER 91RE2. 
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@RISK Output Report for SIZZLER (91RE2) with Soft Kill: 
Performed By: Roy Smith












Minimum 0.3% 5% 0.3%
Maximum 99.6% 10% 0.3%
Mean 11.3% 15% 0.5%
Std Dev 20.1% 20% 0.7%
Variance 0.040572562 25% 0.9%
Skewness 1.807667971 30% 1.1%
Kurtosis 4.830256952 35% 1.4%
Median 2.2% 40% 1.6%
Mode 0.3% 45% 1.9%
Left X 0.3% 50% 2.2%
Left P 5% 55% 2.4%
Right X 51.9% 60% 2.7%
Right P 95% 65% 3.1%
Diff X 51.6% 70% 3.7%
Diff P 90% 75% 4.3%
#Errors 3 80% 5.3%
Filter Min Off 85% 49.4%
Filter Max Off 90% 50.7%
#Filtered 0 95% 51.9%
Rank Name Regr Corr
1 ENGAGE ‐0.697 ‐0.469
2 KILL/HIT ‐0.685 ‐0.471
3 DETECTION ‐0.075 ‐0.035
4 DETECTION‐SK ‐0.046 ‐0.479
5 ENGAGE‐SK ‐0.036 ‐0.348
6 KILL/HIT‐SK ‐0.019 ‐0.155
7 DETECTION‐0 0.000 0
8 ENGAGE‐0 0.000 0









Table 47.   @Risk results for SIZZLER 91RE2 with soft kill. 
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@RISK Output Report for SIZZLER (3M-14E): 
Performed By: Roy Smith












Minimum 0.0% 5% 0.0%
Maximum 75.0% 10% 0.0%
Mean 9.8% 15% 0.0%
Std Dev 14.5% 20% 0.0%
Variance 0.021110794 25% 0.0%
Skewness 1.22228952 30% 0.0%
Kurtosis 3.74324383 35% 0.0%
Median 0.0% 40% 0.0%
Mode 0.0% 45% 0.0%
Left X 0.0% 50% 0.0%
Left P 5% 55% 0.0%
Right X 43.8% 60% 0.0%
Right P 95% 65% 0.0%
Diff X 43.8% 70% 25.0%
Diff P 90% 75% 25.0%
#Errors 0 80% 25.0%
Filter Min Off 85% 25.0%
Filter Max Off 90% 25.0%
#Filtered 0 95% 43.8%
Rank Name Regr Corr
1 KILL/HIT‐0 ‐0.727 ‐0.678
2 ENGAGE‐0 ‐0.710 ‐0.672
3 DETECTION‐0 ‐0.043 ‐0.061
4 DETECTION‐SK 0.000 0
5 DETECTION 0.000 0
6 ENGAGE‐SK 0.000 0
7 ENGAGE 0.000 0
8 KILL/HIT‐SK 0.000 0









Table 48.   @Risk results for SIZZLER 3M14E. 
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@RISK Output Report for SIZZLER (3M-14E) with Soft Kill: 
Performed By: Roy Smith












Minimum 0.3% 5% 0.3%
Maximum 81.1% 10% 0.4%
Mean 11.6% 15% 0.8%
Std Dev 14.6% 20% 1.2%
Variance 0.021311053 25% 1.5%
Skewness 1.329775648 30% 1.8%
Kurtosis 4.193282357 35% 2.1%
Median 3.1% 40% 2.4%
Mode 0.3% 45% 2.6%
Left X 0.3% 50% 3.1%
Left P 5% 55% 3.5%
Right X 43.4% 60% 4.2%
Right P 95% 65% 5.3%
Diff X 43.1% 70% 24.1%
Diff P 90% 75% 25.5%
#Errors 0 80% 26.5%
Filter Min Off 85% 27.2%
Filter Max Off 90% 28.2%
#Filtered 0 95% 43.4%
Rank Name Regr Corr
1 ENGAGE ‐0.684 ‐0.582
2 KILL/HIT ‐0.679 ‐0.577
3 DETECTION‐SK ‐0.065 ‐0.291
4 ENGAGE‐SK ‐0.056 ‐0.257
5 KILL/HIT‐SK ‐0.052 ‐0.265
6 DETECTION ‐0.047 ‐0.019
7 DETECTION‐0 0.000 0
8 ENGAGE‐0 0.000 0









Table 49.   @Risk results for SIZZLER 91 3M14E with soft kill. 
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@RISK Output Report for SACCADE C-802: 
Performed By: Roy Smith












Minimum 0.0% 5% 0.0%
Maximum 66.7% 10% 0.0%
Mean 9.8% 15% 0.0%
Std Dev 12.2% 20% 0.0%
Variance 0.01486641 25% 0.0%
Skewness 1.09151962 30% 0.0%
Kurtosis 3.795525641 35% 0.0%
Median 0.0% 40% 0.0%
Mode 0.0% 45% 0.0%
Left X 0.0% 50% 0.0%
Left P 5% 55% 16.7%
Right X 33.3% 60% 16.7%
Right P 95% 65% 16.7%
Diff X 33.3% 70% 16.7%
Diff P 90% 75% 16.7%
#Errors 0 80% 16.7%
Filter Min Off 85% 16.7%
Filter Max Off 90% 30.6%
#Filtered 0 95% 33.3%
Rank Name Regr Corr
1 ENGAGE‐0 ‐0.708 ‐0.703
2 KILL/HIT‐0 ‐0.685 ‐0.683
3 DETECTION‐0 ‐0.043 ‐0.026
4 DETECTION‐SK 0.000 0
5 DETECTION 0.000 0
6 ENGAGE‐SK 0.000 0
7 ENGAGE 0.000 0
8 KILL/HIT‐SK 0.000 0









Table 50.   @Risk results for SACCADE C-802. 
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@RISK Output Report for SACCADE C-802 with Soft Kill: 
Performed By: Roy Smith












Minimum 0.3% 5% 0.3%
Maximum 59.3% 10% 0.4%
Mean 11.3% 15% 0.7%
Std Dev 12.0% 20% 1.1%
Variance 0.01435744 25% 1.5%
Skewness 1.092317766 30% 1.8%
Kurtosis 3.681302579 35% 2.2%
Median 3.9% 40% 2.6%
Mode 0.3% 45% 3.2%
Left X 0.3% 50% 3.9%
Left P 5% 55% 14.7%
Right X 33.7% 60% 16.4%
Right P 95% 65% 17.3%
Diff X 33.4% 70% 17.7%
Diff P 90% 75% 18.2%
#Errors 0 80% 19.1%
Filter Min Off 85% 20.2%
Filter Max Off 90% 30.5%
#Filtered 0 95% 33.7%
Rank Name Regr Corr
1 ENGAGE ‐0.675 ‐0.635
2 KILL/HIT ‐0.674 ‐0.625
3 DETECTION‐SK ‐0.075 ‐0.316
4 ENGAGE‐SK ‐0.064 ‐0.247
5 DETECTION ‐0.040 ‐0.023
6 KILL/HIT‐SK ‐0.035 ‐0.117
7 DETECTION‐0 0.000 0
8 ENGAGE‐0 0.000 0









Table 51.   @Risk results for SACCADE C-802 with soft kill. 
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@RISK Output Report for SACCADE CAS-8: 
Performed By: Roy Smith












Minimum 0.0% 5% 0.0%
Maximum 58.3% 10% 0.0%
Mean 9.8% 15% 0.0%
Std Dev 12.0% 20% 0.0%
Variance 0.014481981 25% 0.0%
Skewness 1.022657006 30% 0.0%
Kurtosis 3.4620333 35% 0.0%
Median 0.0% 40% 0.0%
Mode 0.0% 45% 0.0%
Left X 0.0% 50% 0.0%
Left P 5% 55% 16.7%
Right X 33.3% 60% 16.7%
Right P 95% 65% 16.7%
Diff X 33.3% 70% 16.7%
Diff P 90% 75% 16.7%
#Errors 0 80% 16.7%
Filter Min Off 85% 16.7%
Filter Max Off 90% 30.6%
#Filtered 0 95% 33.3%
Rank Name Regr Corr
1 ENGAGE‐0 ‐0.702 ‐0.693
2 KILL/HIT‐0 ‐0.697 ‐0.686
3 DETECTION‐0 ‐0.043 ‐0.026
4 DETECTION‐SK 0.000 0
5 DETECTION 0.000 0
6 ENGAGE‐SK 0.000 0
7 ENGAGE 0.000 0
8 KILL/HIT‐SK 0.000 0









Table 52.   @Risk results for SACCADE CAS-8. 
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@RISK Output Report for SACCADE CAS-8 wit Soft Kill: 
Performed By: Roy Smith












Minimum 0.3% 5% 0.3%
Maximum 67.9% 10% 0.5%
Mean 11.3% 15% 0.9%
Std Dev 11.6% 20% 1.2%
Variance 0.013547537 25% 1.6%
Skewness 1.03856592 30% 2.0%
Kurtosis 3.651424441 35% 2.5%
Median 4.2% 40% 2.8%
Mode 0.3% 45% 3.4%
Left X 0.3% 50% 4.2%
Left P 5% 55% 14.8%
Right X 33.5% 60% 16.4%
Right P 95% 65% 17.1%
Diff X 33.2% 70% 17.7%
Diff P 90% 75% 18.3%
#Errors 0 80% 18.9%
Filter Min Off 85% 19.8%
Filter Max Off 90% 30.5%
#Filtered 0 95% 33.5%
Rank Name Regr Corr
1 ENGAGE ‐0.703 ‐0.610
2 KILL/HIT ‐0.700 ‐0.627
3 DETECTION‐SK ‐0.075 ‐0.248
4 ENGAGE‐SK ‐0.067 ‐0.151
5 DETECTION ‐0.047 ‐0.039
6 KILL/HIT‐SK ‐0.034 ‐0.151
7 DETECTION‐0 0.000 0
8 ENGAGE‐0 0.000 0









Table 53.   @Risk results for SACCADE CAS-8 with soft kill. 
 85
@RISK Output Report for SARDINE: 
Performed By: Roy Smith












Minimum 0.0% 5% 0.0%
Maximum 64.0% 10% 0.0%
Mean 9.9% 15% 0.0%
Std Dev 13.1% 20% 0.0%
Variance 0.01725488 25% 0.0%
Skewness 1.08917526 30% 0.0%
Kurtosis 3.573969709 35% 0.0%
Median 0.0% 40% 0.0%
Mode 0.0% 45% 0.0%
Left X 0.0% 50% 0.0%
Left P 5% 55% 0.0%
Right X 36.0% 60% 20.0%
Right P 95% 65% 20.0%
Diff X 36.0% 70% 20.0%
Diff P 90% 75% 20.0%
#Errors 0 80% 20.0%
Filter Min Off 85% 20.0%
Filter Max Off 90% 20.0%
#Filtered 0 95% 36.0%
Rank Name Regr Corr
1 KILL/HIT‐0 ‐0.709 ‐0.668
2 ENGAGE‐0 ‐0.704 ‐0.682
3 DETECTION‐0 ‐0.121 ‐0.131
4 DETECTION‐SK 0.000 0
5 DETECTION 0.000 0
6 ENGAGE‐SK 0.000 0
7 ENGAGE 0.000 0
8 KILL/HIT‐SK 0.000 0









Table 54.   @Risk results for SARDINE. 
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@RISK Output Report for SARDINE with Soft Kill: 
Performed By: Roy Smith












Minimum 0.3% 5% 0.3%
Maximum 69.2% 10% 0.4%
Mean 11.4% 15% 0.8%
Std Dev 13.1% 20% 1.1%
Variance 0.017107899 25% 1.3%
Skewness 1.163582396 30% 1.6%
Kurtosis 3.738940441 35% 2.0%
Median 3.4% 40% 2.4%
Mode 0.3% 45% 2.8%
Left X 0.3% 50% 3.4%
Left P 5% 55% 4.0%
Right X 39.1% 60% 5.5%
Right P 95% 65% 19.5%
Diff X 38.8% 70% 20.3%
Diff P 90% 75% 20.9%
#Errors 0 80% 21.5%
Filter Min Off 85% 22.6%
Filter Max Off 90% 24.5%
#Filtered 0 95% 39.1%
Rank Name Regr Corr
1 KILL/HIT ‐0.681 ‐0.613
2 ENGAGE ‐0.671 ‐0.601
3 DETECTION ‐0.104 ‐0.109
4 DETECTION‐SK ‐0.069 ‐0.330
5 ENGAGE‐SK ‐0.062 ‐0.206
6 KILL/HIT‐SK ‐0.030 ‐0.124
7 DETECTION‐0 0.000 0
8 ENGAGE‐0 0.000 0









Table 55.   @Risk results for SARDINE with soft kill. 
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@RISK Output Report for STYX: 
Performed By: Roy Smith












Minimum 0.0% 5% 0.0%
Maximum 66.7% 10% 0.0%
Mean 9.8% 15% 0.0%
Std Dev 12.4% 20% 0.0%
Variance 0.015303235 25% 0.0%
Skewness 1.055002774 30% 0.0%
Kurtosis 3.520932653 35% 0.0%
Median 0.0% 40% 0.0%
Mode 0.0% 45% 0.0%
Left X 0.0% 50% 0.0%
Left P 5% 55% 0.0%
Right X 33.3% 60% 16.7%
Right P 95% 65% 16.7%
Diff X 33.3% 70% 16.7%
Diff P 90% 75% 16.7%
#Errors 0 80% 16.7%
Filter Min Off 85% 16.7%
Filter Max Off 90% 30.6%
#Filtered 0 95% 33.3%
Rank Name Regr Corr
1 ENGAGE‐0 ‐0.690 ‐0.708
2 KILL/HIT‐0 ‐0.684 ‐0.705
3 DETECTION‐0 ‐0.082 ‐0.063
4 DETECTION‐SK 0.000 0
5 DETECTION 0.000 0
6 ENGAGE‐SK 0.000 0
7 ENGAGE 0.000 0
8 KILL/HIT‐SK 0.000 0









Table 56.   @Risk results for STYX. 
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@RISK Output Report for STYX withSoft Kill: 
Performed By: Roy Smith












Minimum 0.3% 5% 0.3%
Maximum 57.8% 10% 0.7%
Mean 12.7% 15% 1.4%
Std Dev 11.8% 20% 2.1%
Variance 0.013840201 25% 2.8%
Skewness 0.997015293 30% 3.5%
Kurtosis 3.52740429 35% 4.4%
Median 7.8% 40% 5.2%
Mode 0.3% 45% 6.2%
Left X 0.3% 50% 7.8%
Left P 5% 55% 12.9%
Right X 34.9% 60% 15.9%
Right P 95% 65% 17.1%
Diff X 34.6% 70% 18.4%
Diff P 90% 75% 19.8%
#Errors 0 80% 21.5%
Filter Min Off 85% 24.4%
Filter Max Off 90% 30.0%
#Filtered 0 95% 34.9%
Rank Name Regr Corr
1 KILL/HIT ‐0.667 ‐0.621
2 ENGAGE ‐0.667 ‐0.623
3 DETECTION‐SK ‐0.163 ‐0.253
4 ENGAGE‐SK ‐0.143 ‐0.210
5 DETECTION ‐0.078 ‐0.054
6 KILL/HIT‐SK ‐0.070 ‐0.099
7 DETECTION‐0 0.000 0
8 ENGAGE‐0 0.000 0









Table 57.   @Risk results for STYX with soft kill. 
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@RISK Output Report for SUNBURN 3M-80E: 
Performed By: Roy Smith












Minimum 0.0% 5% 0.0%
Maximum 100.0% 10% 0.0%
Mean 9.8% 15% 0.0%
Std Dev 29.7% 20% 0.0%
Variance 0.088484484 25% 0.0%
Skewness 2.708269912 30% 0.0%
Kurtosis 8.345412761 35% 0.0%
Median 0.0% 40% 0.0%
Mode 0.0% 45% 0.0%
Left X 0.0% 50% 0.0%
Left P 5% 55% 0.0%
Right X 100.0% 60% 0.0%
Right P 95% 65% 0.0%
Diff X 100.0% 70% 0.0%
Diff P 90% 75% 0.0%
#Errors 0 80% 0.0%
Filter Min Off 85% 0.0%
Filter Max Off 90% 0.0%
#Filtered 0 95% 100.0%
Rank Name Regr Corr
1 KILL/HIT‐0 ‐0.703 ‐0.696
2 ENGAGE‐0 ‐0.703 ‐0.696
3 DETECTION‐0 0.000 0
4 DETECTION‐SK 0.000 0
5 DETECTION 0.000 0
6 ENGAGE‐SK 0.000 0
7 ENGAGE 0.000 0
8 KILL/HIT‐SK 0.000 0









Table 58.   @Risk results for SUNBURN 3M-80E. 
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@RISK Output Report for SUNBURN 3M-80E with Soft Kill: 
Performed By: Roy Smith












Minimum 0.3% 5% 0.3%
Maximum 100.0% 10% 0.3%
Mean 5.8% 15% 0.3%
Std Dev 18.9% 20% 0.6%
Variance 0.035904144 25% 0.8%
Skewness 4.706737098 30% 1.0%
Kurtosis 23.3280487 35% 1.2%
Median 1.7% 40% 1.4%
Mode 0.3% 45% 1.5%
Left X 0.3% 50% 1.7%
Left P 5% 55% 2.0%
Right X 5.5% 60% 2.2%
Right P 95% 65% 2.5%
Diff X 5.2% 70% 2.7%
Diff P 90% 75% 3.1%
#Errors 60 80% 3.4%
Filter Min Off 85% 3.7%
Filter Max Off 90% 4.2%
#Filtered 0 95% 5.5%
Rank Name Regr Corr
1 ENGAGE ‐0.759 ‐0.249
2 KILL/HIT ‐0.667 ‐0.223
3 DETECTION‐SK ‐0.051 ‐0.626
4 ENGAGE‐SK ‐0.033 ‐0.406
5 KILL/HIT‐SK ‐0.018 ‐0.206
6 DETECTION 0.000 0
7 DETECTION 0.000 0
8 ENGAGE‐0 0.000 0









Table 59.   @Risk results for SUNBURN 3M-80E with soft kill. 
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@RISK Output Report for SUNBURN Kh-41: 
Performed By: Roy Smith












Minimum 0.0% 5% 0.0%
Maximum 100.0% 10% 0.0%
Mean 9.9% 15% 0.0%
Std Dev 20.9% 20% 0.0%
Variance 0.043591341 25% 0.0%
Skewness 1.810233511 30% 0.0%
Kurtosis 4.955478058 35% 0.0%
Median 0.0% 40% 0.0%
Mode 0.0% 45% 0.0%
Left X 0.0% 50% 0.0%
Left P 5% 55% 0.0%
Right X 50.0% 60% 0.0%
Right P 95% 65% 0.0%
Diff X 50.0% 70% 0.0%
Diff P 90% 75% 0.0%
#Errors 0 80% 0.0%
Filter Min Off 85% 50.0%
Filter Max Off 90% 50.0%
#Filtered 0 95% 50.0%
Rank Name Regr Corr
1 KILL/HIT‐0 ‐0.717 ‐0.691
2 ENGAGE‐0 ‐0.706 ‐0.689
3 DETECTION‐0 0.000 0
4 DETECTION‐SK 0.000 0
5 DETECTION 0.000 0
6 ENGAGE‐SK 0.000 0
7 ENGAGE 0.000 0
8 KILL/HIT‐SK 0.000 0









Table 60.   @Risk results for SUNBURN Kh-41. 
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@RISK Output Report for ASCM SUNBURN Kh-41 with Soft Kill: 
Performed By: Roy Smith












Minimum 0.3% 5% 0.3%
Maximum 99.8% 10% 0.3%
Mean 11.3% 15% 0.5%
Std Dev 20.1% 20% 0.7%
Variance 0.040537431 25% 1.0%
Skewness 1.773067124 30% 1.2%
Kurtosis 4.690061182 35% 1.4%
Median 2.2% 40% 1.6%
Mode 0.3% 45% 1.9%
Left X 0.3% 50% 2.2%
Left P 5% 55% 2.5%
Right X 51.9% 60% 2.7%
Right P 95% 65% 3.1%
Diff X 51.6% 70% 3.5%
Diff P 90% 75% 4.0%
#Errors 2 80% 5.0%
Filter Min Off 85% 49.6%
Filter Max Off 90% 50.8%
#Filtered 0 95% 51.9%
Rank Name Regr Corr
1 KILL/HIT ‐0.723 ‐0.473
2 ENGAGE ‐0.682 ‐0.463
3 DETECTION‐SK ‐0.046 ‐0.478
4 ENGAGE‐SK ‐0.032 ‐0.372
5 KILL/HIT‐SK ‐0.008 ‐0.160
6 DETECTION 0.000 0
7 DETECTION 0.000 0
8 ENGAGE‐0 0.000 0









Table 61.   @Risk results for SUNBURN Kh-41 with soft kill. 
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@RISK Output Report for SWITCHBLADE: 
Performed By: Roy Smith












Minimum 0.0% 5% 0.0%
Maximum 60.0% 10% 0.0%
Mean 9.8% 15% 0.0%
Std Dev 13.2% 20% 0.0%
Variance 0.017296002 25% 0.0%
Skewness 1.110929065 30% 0.0%
Kurtosis 3.519591575 35% 0.0%
Median 0.0% 40% 0.0%
Mode 0.0% 45% 0.0%
Left X 0.0% 50% 0.0%
Left P 5% 55% 0.0%
Right X 36.0% 60% 20.0%
Right P 95% 65% 20.0%
Diff X 36.0% 70% 20.0%
Diff P 90% 75% 20.0%
#Errors 0 80% 20.0%
Filter Min Off 85% 20.0%
Filter Max Off 90% 20.0%
#Filtered 0 95% 36.0%
Rank Name Regr Corr
1 KILL/HIT‐0 ‐0.707 ‐0.687
2 ENGAGE‐0 ‐0.705 ‐0.684
3 DETECTION‐0 ‐0.033 ‐0.062
4 DETECTION‐SK 0.000 0
5 DETECTION 0.000 0
6 ENGAGE‐SK 0.000 0
7 ENGAGE 0.000 0
8 KILL/HIT‐SK 0.000 0









Table 62.   @Risk results for SWITCHBLADE. 
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@RISK Output Report for SWITCHBLADE with Soft Kill: 
Performed By: Roy Smith












Minimum 0.3% 5% 0.3%
Maximum 69.7% 10% 0.5%
Mean 12.8% 15% 1.2%
Std Dev 12.6% 20% 1.8%
Variance 0.015963894 25% 2.4%
Skewness 1.087512177 30% 3.1%
Kurtosis 3.794972463 35% 3.7%
Median 6.7% 40% 4.6%
Mode 0.3% 45% 5.8%
Left X 0.3% 50% 6.7%
Left P 5% 55% 8.7%
Right X 39.0% 60% 15.2%
Right P 95% 65% 19.1%
Diff X 38.7% 70% 20.3%
Diff P 90% 75% 21.6%
#Errors 0 80% 23.0%
Filter Min Off 85% 24.4%
Filter Max Off 90% 27.4%
#Filtered 0 95% 39.0%
Rank Name Regr Corr
1 KILL/HIT ‐0.699 ‐0.611
2 ENGAGE ‐0.681 ‐0.577
3 DETECTION‐SK ‐0.145 ‐0.271
4 ENGAGE‐SK ‐0.133 ‐0.208
5 KILL/HIT‐SK ‐0.072 ‐0.087
6 DETECTION ‐0.050 ‐0.037
7 DETECTION‐0 0.000 0
8 ENGAGE‐0 0.000 0









Table 63.   @Risk results for SSWITCHBLADE with soft kill. 
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Minimum 0.0% 5% 0.0%
Maximum 100.0% 10% 0.0%
Mean 9.7% 15% 0.0%
Std Dev 20.7% 20% 0.0%
Variance 0.043009009 25% 0.0%
Skewness 1.819235279 30% 0.0%
Kurtosis 4.923506661 35% 0.0%
Median 0.0% 40% 0.0%
Mode 0.0% 45% 0.0%
Left X 0.0% 50% 0.0%
Left P 5% 55% 0.0%
Right X 50.0% 60% 0.0%
Right P 95% 65% 0.0%
Diff X 50.0% 70% 0.0%
Diff P 90% 75% 0.0%
#Errors 0 80% 0.0%
Filter Min Off 85% 50.0%
Filter Max Off 90% 50.0%
#Filtered 0 95% 50.0%
Rank Name Regr Corr
1 ENGAGE‐0 ‐0.704 ‐0.698
2 KILL/HIT‐0 ‐0.701 ‐0.694
3 DETECTION‐0 0.000 0
4 DETECTION‐SK 0.000 0
5 DETECTION 0.000 0
6 ENGAGE‐SK 0.000 0
7 ENGAGE 0.000 0
8 KILL/HIT‐SK 0.000 0
9 KILL/HIT 0.000 0
Regression and Rank Information for ASCM SURVIV
 
Table 64.   @Risk results for BRAHMOS. 
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@RISK Output Report for BRAHMOS with Soft Kill: 
Performed By: Roy Smith












Minimum 0.3% 5% 0.3%
Maximum 99.4% 10% 0.3%
Mean 11.3% 15% 0.4%
Std Dev 20.4% 20% 0.7%
Variance 0.041537364 25% 0.9%
Skewness 1.865956565 30% 1.1%
Kurtosis 5.138174772 35% 1.4%
Median 2.2% 40% 1.6%
Mode 0.3% 45% 1.9%
Left X 0.3% 50% 2.2%
Left P 5% 55% 2.5%
Right X 51.8% 60% 2.8%
Right P 95% 65% 3.2%
Diff X 51.5% 70% 3.6%
Diff P 90% 75% 4.1%
#Errors 1 80% 5.3%
Filter Min Off 85% 49.4%
Filter Max Off 90% 50.7%
#Filtered 0 95% 51.8%
Rank Name Regr Corr
1 KILL/HIT ‐0.687 ‐0.480
2 ENGAGE ‐0.663 ‐0.470
3 DETECTION ‐0.077 ‐0.053
4 DETECTION‐SK ‐0.049 ‐0.453
5 ENGAGE‐SK ‐0.030 ‐0.346
6 KILL/HIT‐SK ‐0.016 ‐0.207
7 DETECTION‐0 0.000 0
8 ENGAGE‐0 0.000 0









Table 65.   @Risk results for BRAHMOS with soft kill. 
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@RISK Output Report for RBS-15: 
Performed By: Roy Smith












Minimum 0.0% 5% 0.0%
Maximum 62.5% 10% 0.0%
Mean 9.8% 15% 0.0%
Std Dev 14.4% 20% 0.0%
Variance 0.020799076 25% 0.0%
Skewness 1.15096283 30% 0.0%
Kurtosis 3.323053469 35% 0.0%
Median 0.0% 40% 0.0%
Mode 0.0% 45% 0.0%
Left X 0.0% 50% 0.0%
Left P 5% 55% 0.0%
Right X 43.8% 60% 0.0%
Right P 95% 65% 0.0%
Diff X 43.8% 70% 25.0%
Diff P 90% 75% 25.0%
#Errors 0 80% 25.0%
Filter Min Off 85% 25.0%
Filter Max Off 90% 25.0%
#Filtered 0 95% 43.8%
Rank Name Regr Corr
1 KILL/HIT‐0 ‐0.726 ‐0.679
2 ENGAGE‐0 ‐0.719 ‐0.669
3 DETECTION‐0 ‐0.043 ‐0.060
4 DETECTION‐SK 0.000 0
5 DETECTION 0.000 0
6 ENGAGE‐SK 0.000 0
7 ENGAGE 0.000 0
8 KILL/HIT‐SK 0.000 0









Table 66.   @Risk results for RBS-15. 
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@RISK Output Report for RBS-15 with Soft Kill: 
Performed By: Roy Smith












Minimum 0.3% 5% 0.3%
Maximum 62.8% 10% 0.4%
Mean 11.6% 15% 0.9%
Std Dev 13.9% 20% 1.3%
Variance 0.01944453 25% 1.6%
Skewness 1.132175366 30% 1.8%
Kurtosis 3.316024125 35% 2.1%
Median 3.2% 40% 2.5%
Mode 0.3% 45% 2.8%
Left X 0.3% 50% 3.2%
Left P 5% 55% 3.8%
Right X 41.0% 60% 4.5%
Right P 95% 65% 6.4%
Diff X 40.7% 70% 24.4%
Diff P 90% 75% 25.4%
#Errors 0 80% 26.1%
Filter Min Off 85% 27.1%
Filter Max Off 90% 27.8%
#Filtered 0 95% 41.0%
Rank Name Regr Corr
1 ENGAGE ‐0.725 ‐0.558
2 KILL/HIT ‐0.724 ‐0.560
3 DETECTION‐SK ‐0.064 ‐0.330
4 ENGAGE‐SK ‐0.051 ‐0.251
5 KILL/HIT‐SK ‐0.050 ‐0.237
6 DETECTION 0.000 0
7 DETECTION 0.000 0
8 ENGAGE‐0 0.000 0









Table 67.   @Risk results for RBS-15 with soft kill. 
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